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Abstract 
This thesis looks at the role of scientists and the effectiveness of their scientific advice during policy 
development of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan in Australia. It combines the framework of Pielke 
(2007) on possible roles of scientists with the theory of Cash et al. (2003) on how to measure 
effectiveness of scientific advice, to investigate if a causal relation can be found between role and 
effectiveness. The Murray-Darling Basin Authority as a scientific body chose to take the role of Issue 
Advocate, and most of the individual scientists the role of Science Arbiter, but it can be hypothesised 
that the role of Honest Broker would have been more effective for this type of problem. The process of 
policy development for this case study shows two distinctive stages. During the first stage, the 
Authority’s interpretation of the mandate was to give preference to improving environmental health, 
whereas during the second stage the Authority was asked to re-interpret the mandate to give equal 
weight to environmental, social and economic impact. The scientific advice reflects this: during the 
second stage the proposed volume of water to be returned to the environment was lower than during 
the first stage. The effectiveness of the scientific advice for both stages was different even though the 
Authority chose the same role in both stages, which leads to the conclusion that in this case no direct 
causal relationship can be found between a certain role and effectiveness of the advice. However, a 
closer look reveals that during the first stage elements of the role of Science Arbiter are more 
prevalent, and in the second stage the element of stakeholder engagement of the role of Honest 
Broker. This implies that the role of Issue Advocate can be effective if combined with stakeholder 
engagement. It also reveals that the advice in the second stage was based on a different value set, 
which was more aligned with the majority of the decision makers. The thesis further suggests that 
Pielke’s framework could be refined with regards to the effectiveness of the role of Issue Advocate, 
combined with the choice of value alignment to improve salience, and the influence of stakeholder 
engagement to improve legitimacy.  
 
 
Korte samenvatting 
Deze scriptie kijkt naar de rol van wetenschappers en de mate van effectiviteit van hun 
wetenschappelijk advies tijdens de ontwikkeling van het beleidsplan Murray-Darling Basin Plan in 
Australie. Daartoe worden twee kaders gebruikt, namelijk het framework van Pielke (2007) over 
mogelijke rollen die gekozen kunnen worden door wetenschappers, en de theorie van Cash et al. 
(2003) over hoe effectiviteit van wetenschappelijk advies gemeten kan worden. Het doel is om te 
onderzoeken of er een causaal verband is tussen de rol en de mate van effectiviteit.  
De Authority koos de rol van Issue Advocate. De meeste individuele wetenschappers kozen de rol 
van Science Arbiter. Voor het type probleem was theoretisch gezien de rol van Honest Broker 
waarschijnlijk de meeste effectieve. Het proces van beleidsontwikkeling toont twee fasen. De 
Authority’s interpretatie van het mandaat tijdens de eerste fase gaf meer gewicht aan natuurbelangen, 
terwijl dit in de tweede fase verschoof naar een gelijke verdeling tussen milieu, economie en 
maatschappij. Het wetenschappelijk advies veranderde daarmee: het aangeraden volume aan water 
om terug te geven aan de natuur was tijdens de tweede fase kleiner dan tijdens de eerste fase. De 
mate van effectiviteit voor de tweede fase was hoger dan voor de eerste fase, ondanks dat de 
Authority tijdens beide fasen dezelfde rol had gespeeld. Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat er in dit geval 
geen duidelijk oorzakelijk verband kan worden aangetoond tussen rol en effectiviteit. Bij nadere 
beschouwing blijkt er echter wel een verband te zijn: de eerste fase vertoont meer kenmerken van de 
rol van Science Arbiter, terwijl in de tweede fase de stakeholders meer betrokken zijn (kenmerk van 
de Honest Broker). Dit geeft aan dat de rol van Issue Advocate effectief kan zijn als de stakeholders 
voldoende betrokken zijn bij het proces. Tevens bleek dat het advies in de tweede fase meer aansloot 
bij de mening van de besluitvormers. De scriptie stelt voor dat het framework van Pielke verbeterd 
kan worden door te kijken naar de effectiviteit van de rol van Issue Advocate in combinatie met de 
keus voor een bepaalde mening en het niveau van stakeholder engagement.  
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List of acronyms and abbreviations 
The Authority: the six-member board of the MDBA 
Basin States the four States and one Territory through which the Murray and the Darling flow 
(Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and the Australian Capital 
Territory)  
CSIRO: Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (national science 
agency) 
Draft: Draft of the Proposed Basin Plan (published in November 2011) 
ESLT: Environmentally Sustainable Level of Take  
Guide:   Guide to the Proposed Basin Plan (published in October 2010) 
MDB:   Murray-Darling Basin 
MDBA:   Murray-Darling Basin Authority 
MDBC:   Murray-Darling Basin Commission, predecessor of the MDBA 
MDBP:   Murray-Darling Basin Plan, water management plan developed by MDBA 
SDL: Long-term average sustainable diversion limits (SDLs) represent the amount of water 
which can be used for consumption after the environmental requirements have been 
met.  
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Summary 
The relation between science and policy has changed over the past years from being distinct entities 
(science as independent/objective, policy as based on values and negotiations) to the recognition that 
the boundary between science and policy is less strict, and can sometimes even become blurred, 
certainly for complex and controversial issues. Policy making for complex environmental problems is 
now often structured around boundary organisations: organisations where representatives from the 
science and policy communities work together on so-called boundary objects (e.g. co-produced 
reports or models). These boundary organisations can play different roles. Pielke (2007) has defined 
a framework with four roles (Pure Scientist, Science Arbiter, Honest Broker and Issue Advocate), and 
argued that the effectiveness of scientific advice depends on the chosen role, in combination with the 
levels of consensus on values and knowledge within the environmental problem. This case study 
analysed the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) and the development of the Murray-Darling 
Basin Plan to further refine Pielke’s framework, as part of a program with two other case studies in 
Europe. The main research question is: can a causal relation be found between the role taken by the 
MDBA, and the effectiveness of their advice? The study uses the model of Cash et al. (2003) to 
measure effectiveness of policy advice and therefore looks at credibility, salience and legitimacy of 
that advice. Information has been collected through secondary analysis of literature, government 
reports and a series of semi-structured interviews. 
 
The analysis has focused on two stages during the development of the Basin Plan: the process 
leading up to the Guide to the Proposed Basin Plan (Guide) in 2010 and the subsequent process 
leading up to the Draft of the Proposed Basin Plan (Draft) in 2011. Overall the Draft can be 
considered to be a more effective advice than the Guide. The Guide scored reasonably high on 
credibility but low on legitimacy. Interviewees indicate that the reason for the low level of legitimacy of 
the Guide should be sought in the lack of communication and transparency in the process leading up 
to the Guide: there had been no engagement with local communities and the results and conclusions 
were not shared until the presentation. The Draft scored low on legitimacy and credibility from the 
point of view of the science domain but much higher than the Guide on credibility and legitimacy from 
the policy and society domains.  
 
The role that was ultimately chosen by the Authority for both stages (Guide and Draft) was that of 
Issue Advocate. This is a result of the fact that the MDBA was required by the Water Act to provide 
one solution or a limited set of solutions. As the effectiveness in the second stage was higher than in 
the first, even though the role did not change, it can be concluded that a causal relationship between 
role and effectiveness is not immediately evident. 
 
The analysis shows that the problem was first considered to be a moderately structured problem (with 
consensus on knowledge but no consensus on values). The MDBA during the first stage operated 
according to the organisational structure and requirements as described in the mandate of the MDBA 
(the Water Act 2007 (Cth.)). Even though the Authority ultimately chose the role of Issue Advocate, 
these organisational requirements follow to a large degree the logic of the Science Arbiter role (with a 
focus on unbiased science developed independently, without stakeholder engagement until after the 
presentation of the science), which is (according to the theory) the best fit for a moderately structured 
problem. During the process the problem turned out to be an unstructured problem (with no 
consensus on values or knowledge). The second stage (though again the Authority chose the role of 
Issue Advocate) showed more similarities with the role of Honest Broker by including stakeholder 
engagement, which is (according to the theory) the best fit for an unstructured problem. This new 
approach resulted in higher legitimacy for the second stage. So, despite the fact that the ultimate role 
did not change, the fact that elements of the Honest Broker role became more prevalent during the 
second stage resulted in higher effectiveness of the advice. Pielke’s framework expects advocates to 
only engage with those stakeholders with similar value sets, but this example shows that this does not 
have to be the case: a boundary organisation can provide policy advice with one preferred solution 
after consulting a wide range of stakeholders, and not only after consulting no-one or only a limited 
group. In this example, advice that was produced after wider stakeholder engagement was more 
effective than advice produced without stakeholder engagement, even though in both cases the 
advice was one solution instead of a range of solutions. This means that, despite the fact that Pielke’s 
framework suggests that the role of Honest Broker would be the most effective role for unstructured 
problems, the role of Issue Advocate can still be effective, if it includes wider stakeholder 
engagement.  
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Another observation is that in the second stage the advocacy was aligned with a different value set. 
The Authority’s original interpretation of the mandate during the first stage was to give preference to 
improving environmental health (based on a sustainability principle). Due to the negative community 
response (as a result of the low score in legitimacy), politicians changed their view on the mandate 
and asked the Authority to re-interpret the mandate to give equal weight to environmental, social and 
economic impact. The scientific advice reflects this: the proposed volume of water to be returned to 
the environment in the Draft (second stage) was lower than in the Guide (first stage). The fact that the 
value set in the second stage was better aligned to the political context resulted in higher salience, 
and consequently higher effectiveness, of the advice. This means that, despite the fact that Pielke’s 
framework suggests that the role of Honest Broker would be the most effective role for unstructured 
problems, the role of Issue Advocate can still be effective, if it is closely aligned with the political 
context. The risk of the role of Issue Advocate is that advice which is based on a judgement call and 
aligned with one specific value set can be considered to be less credible (if it is suspected that the 
results of the science are adjusted to fit the chosen value set) and less legitimate (if it is considered to 
be unfair to those who disagree with the value alignment). In this case study stakeholder engagement 
has increased legitimacy, but credibility was low from the scientists’ point of view.  
 
Pielke’s framework looks at the degree to which value sets are related to the four different roles. 
Although in some literature stakeholder engagement within the role of Issue Advocate is limited to 
engaging with like-minded groups and individuals, it is possible that the Advocate consults with all 
parties but still provides an advice with a value choice (judgement call). This would not have been 
recognised under Pielke’s framework. Based on this case study it seems that Pielke’s framework 
could be refined with regards to the effectiveness of the role of Issue Advocate combined with the 
choice of value alignment to improve salience and the influence of stakeholder engagement to 
improve legitimacy. 
 
It would be interesting to see if this result can be found in other case studies as well, and perhaps with 
a larger/different set of indicators for effectivity. It could also be interesting to repeat this study in a 
different cultural environment, especially where the inclusion of local knowledge is more prevalent and 
scientists are more used to the role of Honest Broker.  
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1 Introduction  
In the past, the policy and science domains were often looked upon as separate/distinct entities. 
Science was seen as independent, truthful, objective and based on facts, as opposed to policy which 
was seen as based on values, interests and ideology, with bargaining and negotiations influencing 
results (Huitema & Turnhout, 2009). As a result past models of policy design and evaluation describe 
the role of science in policy making mainly as the deliverer of independent and uncontested 
knowledge, which can then be used by policy makers in the decision making process . A well-known 
model describing this is the CUDOS model of Merton, which states that good science is only possible 
if scientists follow four scientific norms (“cudos”), an abbreviation which refers to communalism 
(common ownership of scientific discoveries), universalism (no bias or different interpretations based 
on race, class, gender, religion or nationality), disinterestedness (without prejudice or personal 
values) and organised skepticism (peer review scrutiny) (Merton, 1973). Following these norms would 
keep science free from political influence and would ensure credibility of scientific knowledge. 
 
In the past few decades, many authors have recognised that in reality this demarcation is less strict, 
especially for environmental problems (Brown, 2015). This change in the relation between science 
and policy is partly due to the fact that environmental problems have become more complex. 
Originally, policies for environmental problems were dealing with for example noise or pollution, which 
are local problems with a relatively high level of agreement on what the problem is, and therefore a 
high level of agreement on what the solutions should be. Science in these cases only delivers the 
facts (e.g. level of pollution). More recent environmental problems are less local, but international (e.g. 
acid rain) or even global (e.g. climate change). These environmental problems are not 
straightforward, but have uncertainties, either on values, on knowledge or on both. These 
uncertainties make it difficult to define a clear cause-and-effect relationship and usually do not result 
in a clear solution (Guston, 2001). Hisschemöller, Eberg, Engels, and Moltke (2009) categorised 
environmental problems and identified four types, based on consensus of values and consensus on 
knowledge. An environmental problem is considered ‘structured’ when there is a general agreement 
on the underlying values and on what kind of knowledge is needed to solve the problem. When there 
is no consensus on values and a difference in perspectives, and when there is no agreement on the 
kind of knowledge that is needed, the problem is considered to be ‘unstructured’ or ‘wicked’. Climate 
change is a classic example of an unstructured problem, whereas local issues like the pollution of one 
specific lake can be structured problems. Uncertainty in scientific knowledge is something that policy 
makers find difficult to deal with. At the same time the solutions to these international and global 
environmental problems have a high cost, which means that policy makers need strong arguments to 
have these solutions accepted by their electorate. 
 
Another reason for the change in the relation between science and policy is that the public in general 
has changed its views on science, scientific knowledge and scientists: where they used to be seen as 
a respectable albeit somewhat distant group, with higher levels of expertise and thus authority, the 
public is now more critical of scientists. The main reasons are that in general people have higher 
levels of education, have access to more information through the internet, are more aware of the 
uncertainties in scientific knowledge, and add knowledge (based on experience and education) of 
their own. Accidents with new technologies that allegedly could never fail (e.g. nuclear energy) have 
made people question scientific claims. Apart from that, non-scientific organisations like NGOs have 
become important sources for knowledge, which is often based on a combination of experience and 
research (Huitema & Turnhout, 2009; Turnhout & Halffman, 2012) .  
 
As a result the terminology and conceptual models about knowledge production and the relation 
between science and policy have been changing over the past few decades. To be able to decsribe 
these changes, new models and terms have been coined, such as ‘post-academic’ science (Ziman, 
1996) and ‘mode 2’ knowledge production (Gibbons, 1994)- where science is more focused on 
solving problems and less on only providing objective knowledge. These models recognise that 
solutions to complex environmental issues need collaboration from both scientists and policy makers. 
This collaboration is called boundary work (Gieryn, 1983). Boundary work is important to improve 
communication and understanding of the differences between science and policy, especially with 
regards to norms, values and expectations (Cash et al., 2003). Figure 1 shows the communication 
functions of boundary work between the science domain and the policy domain: boundary work 
translates policy questions to research questions, and after doing the research, translates scientific 
knowledge back to knowledge that can be used for policy making (Turnhout & Halffman, 2012).  
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Figure 1. The functions of boundary work between the domains of science and policy (adapted from 
(Turnhout & Halffman, 2012) 
 
Some of this boundary work is formalised through boundary organisations (Broekhans & Turnhout, 
2012; Guston, 2001). The aim of a boundary organisation is to work with ‘blurred’ boundaries that 
allow coproduction of knowledge and solutions, but maintain some demarcation between the two 
domains, to prevent over-politicisation of science and over-scientification of policy. This is a fine line. 
The main risks for scientists of being involved in boundary work are that scientific experts can be 
accused of advocacy because they are working closely with policy makers, and that it can be seen as 
a closed group by the outside world, which makes it difficult for outsiders to check their work (e.g. 
through peer review)(Turnhout & Halffman, 2012). These risks are relevant for both individual 
scientists and boundary organisations.  
 
Boundary organisations typically include representatives from the science and the policy domain as 
well as professionals who manage the integration and mediation of these two domains; have dual 
accountibilty; and develop boundary objects (Cash et al., 2003; Guston, 2001; Hoppe, Wesselink, & 
Cairns, 2013). The dual accountability means that the organisation has responsibilities to both the 
policy and science domain. This is intended to maintain different identities between science and 
policy. Boundary objects are useful because they allow for one object to be used on both sides of the 
boundary, and are a ‘forum’ for coproducing knowledge. They can include agreed limitations and 
assumptions, for example through setting ranges for computer models and standardising parameters 
for tests (excluding everything outside the range or parameters).  
 
Another discussion with regard to the relation between science and policy concerns the role scientists 
can choose to play during knowledge production as part of developing scientific advice to policy 
makers. This discussion is relevant for individual scientists and for boundary organisations. For 
example, for the original linear model of knowledge production scientists will only provide facts and 
numbers, but for more complex problems they may choose to add explanations to those facts, include 
other knowledge, provide possible solutions or even advocate one specific solution. One typology in 
that discussion is a framework developed by Pielke (2007), which describes four different roles: 
honest broker, issue advocate, pure scientist and science arbiter. The effectiveness of each of these 
roles is expected to depend on the type of problem and other background factors (Pielke, 2007; 
Spruijt et al., 2014). Spruijt et al. (2014) present an overview of literature around the subject of roles of 
scientists as policy advisors. They conclude that most of the publications about this subject have been 
theoretical in nature and they recommend a far greater emphasis on empirical research. 
 
Researchers from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and the Open University Netherlands are 
conducting a comparison study to analyse Pielke’s model through several case studies. These case 
studies each analyse a specific scientific advisory group or committee during the policy making 
process of water management or flood risk issues. The main question of the program is whether or 
not it is possible to identify if there is a causal relation between the role these advisory committees 
have played and the effectiveness of their advice.  
 
This case study is part of that program and focuses on the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) in 
Australia, during the development of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan. The MDBA was established in 
2008 to develop and implement a water reform plan for the Murray-Darling Basin, according to a 
mandate described in the Water Act 2007 (Cth) . This thesis considers the MDBA to be a boundary 
organisation, with the caveat that it has a stronger accountability to the policy domain than to the 
science domain, as the organisation itself reports to the Minister for Environment. The MDBA is also 
somewhat limited as a boundary organisation in that it does not cover the entire boundary: the MDBA 
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is responsible for developing the Basin Plan, but the Basin States1 are responsible for implementation 
choices.  
 
The MDBA was still a learning organisation when it started, and adapted its approach to the 
interaction of science and policy in different stages of the process of developing the Basin Plan. This 
is the result of the fact that the MDBA is functioning on Commonwealth level, whereas its predecessor 
- the Murray-Darling Basin Committee - operated on State-level. The development of the Basin Plan 
has been an ongoing process, starting with the Water Act in 2007, to the endorsement of the Minister 
of the Environment in 2012, and is still being modified today. This case study will be looking at the 
early stages of the development of the Basin Plan. The scope of this case study is the development of 
the first major boundary object, which is the Guide to the Proposed Basin Plan (Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority, 2010), and the subsequent development of the first Draft of the Proposed Basin Plan 
(Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 2011). The results of this study can provide valuable insights into the 
practical applicability of Pielke’s framework. These insights could then assist in providing practical 
recommendations for improving the framework. 
 
To measure the effectiveness of policy advice the program uses a framework as described by Cash et 
al. (2003), which is based on the viewpoint that measuring effectiveness should look at the process of 
the development of the advice, instead of the product itself. This research will analyse the process of 
the development of the Basin Plan. Measuring effectiveness of policy advice is based on three 
indicators: credibility (is the advice scientifically accurate), salience (to what extent is the advice 
relevant at this time) and legitimacy (is the advice respectful and acceptable for all stakeholders) 
(Cash et al., 2003). This research will look at how scientific knowledge is created, presented and used 
in the Guide and the Draft of the Proposed Basin Plan; look at the consultation process; and look at 
the resulting changes in the revised and altered Basin Plan. This will be used to analyse which role 
the MDBA has played according to Pielke (2007) and how effective the advice has been. 
 
The main research question is: Can a causal relation be found between the role taken by the MDBA, 
and the effectiveness of its advice? 
 
With these derived questions: 
A. What is the relation between the three criteria for effectiveness (salience, credibility, legitimacy) 
and Pielke’s roles, as discussed in literature? 
B. Which role would be the most effective according to Pielke, based on the type of problem? 
C. Which role did the MDBA take? 
D. How effective was their advice (in terms of salience, credibility and legitimacy)? 
 
Question A and B will be answered in chapter 2, question C and D answered in chapter 5, and the 
main research question in chapter 6.  
 
  
                                                     
 
 
1 The Basin States are the four States and one Territory through which the Murray and the Darling 
Rivers flow through (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and the Australian 
Capital Territory) 
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2 Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework is based on two theoretical models: the framework of Roger Pielke (2007), 
which describes four possible roles that scientists can take while advising policy makers on the 
science-policy interface; and the framework of Cash et al. (2003) which describes how to measure 
effectiveness of scientific advice based on the process instead of the product. These two theoretical 
models are explained in more detail in section 2.1 and 2.2 respectively.  
2.1 Roles  
 
Scientists who get involved with the interface between the science and policy domain, most often by 
providing scientific answers to questions posed by policy makers, can take different roles during that 
process. In the past, the role of scientists was considered to be impartial, unbiased, independent, 
reliable and factual only, whereas the decisions of policy makers were viewed to be based on values, 
ideology and negotiation (Huitema & Turnhout, 2009). Nowadays it is recognised that this is an 
impractical distinction, and that scientists can have different positions in the science-policy interface. 
The typology used in this study to describe these different roles is from Roger Pielke (2007). Pielke 
recognises the possibilities of politicisation of science and scientification of politics, and in his 
framework points out four different roles that can be played on the science-policy interface: Pure 
Scientist, Science Arbiter, Issue Advocate and Honest Broker of Policy Alternatives. Pielke’s 
framework is widely discussed in literature, for example by Broekhans and Turnhout (2012), Brown 
(2008), Huitema and Turnhout (2009) and von Storch and Bray (2010).  
 
The role of pure scientist follows the classical model of linear science: pure scientists are only 
involved in delivering facts and data without voicing their own opinions or political interpretations, and 
without suggesting solutions. Their view is that science should be untainted by political or social 
values, but should be impartial and separated from society and policy, to remain objective and 
credible. 
 
Scientists who adopt the role of science arbiter will deliver scientific facts but in answer to specific 
questions from policy makers. They will also make sure that their knowledge and facts are used in the 
correct way and not misinterpreted. They are engaged in political issues and will try to prevent misuse 
of their data, but will not otherwise interfere with the decision making process. The arbiter provides 
factual information to those questions that can be answered through research, and if asked for 
judgement calls will base them on facts, often through rational ‘if-then’ statements. Interaction 
between policy and science is seen as acceptable and not considered a threat to remain objective. 
 
The role of issue advocate delivers scientific facts but also steers towards one specific solution that 
the scientist feels would be best, based on the information available. The advocates feel that their 
expertise entitles them, or even requires them, to voice an opinion. The issue advocate will not only 
provide knowledge but also interpret the results and provide advice. This advice (although a result of 
scientific research) is based on an interpretation of the problem definition. Issue advocates will 
actively promote the solution that is considered to be the best option based on their expertise and 
value set, but will mostly seek input from and align themselves with stakeholders with a similar world 
view. According to Brown (2008) this can be a legitimate position in situations where there is an 
inequality in power between contested views or exclusion of certain positions. It is not uncommon that 
scientists find themselves in this role involuntarily, if they deal with a problem that has strongly 
contested views. Pielke (2007) also discusses Stealth Issue Advocates. This happens when 
scientists present themselves in a different role (e.g. Science Arbiter or Honest Broker), but in reality 
limit themselves to a selective set of questions or knowledge, which results in hidden advocacy.  
 
Scientists in the role of honest broker will attempt to broaden the range of policy options, by 
providing a set of different options or scenarios of solutions, with associated impacts and results of 
these solutions. The broker closely works with decision makers and will look for several alternative 
solutions based on his expertise and knowledge, and will add the possible impacts of these different 
options. The aim is that policy makers will have a range of options to choose from but also to find new 
ways to solve a problem depending on different value sets, to enable the decision makers to make an 
informed choice. Honest brokers will engage with stakeholders, to be able to define and discuss the 
impacts and results of the different options. This ensures inclusion of all perspectives and interests. 
The intent is not to put forward a personal opinion but to honestly try to incorporate all views and 
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values to present different policy alternatives. The risk is that the honest broker can be considered to 
be an advocate for his own interests or interests of one particular group (stealth advocate). This is 
because they acknowledge the needs of the various stakeholders (Broekhans & Turnhout, 2012), but 
also because in complex situations providing different policy alternatives is already preceded by 
selections, choices and assumptions.  
 
An adaptation of these additions to Pielke’s framework can be found in Table 1. It describes how 
scientists behave in each role, and how they can be identified. This table will be used for the analysis 
in chapter 5.  
  
Table 1. Criteria to identify roles, based on Pielke (2007), Huitema and Turnhout (2009) and 
Broekhans and Turnhout (2012) 
Role Criteria to identify 
Pure scientist - only numbers and facts are provided 
- no focus on questions from decision makers 
- no selection, interpretation or translation of information for decision 
makers 
- no discussion with politicians or political debate 
- interaction between policy and science is one-way: science provides, 
policy uses, and science does not interfere with decision making 
Science Arbiter - only numbers and facts are given, sometimes with added ‘if-then’ 
statements 
- intervention when provided knowledge or facts are misinterpreted 
and/or used incorrect 
Issue Advocate - the advice that is given steers towards one preferred solution or set of 
solutions 
- the advice is based on factual research and a specific interpretation of 
the problem definition  
- the advice is based on assumptions and exclusion of alternative options 
(Honest) Broker - the advice includes several solutions for the decision maker to choose 
from 
- information is used to show effects/impacts of different alternatives 
- stakeholders are engaged  
- different value sets and uncertainties are taken into account through 
providing a variety of solutions 
 
2.2 Effectiveness  
 
This study aims to measure the effectiveness of the policy advice by using the framework of Cash et 
al. (2003). This framework claims that effectiveness should be measured based on the process of the 
development of the advice, instead of looking at the product. Looking at the product means evaluating 
the actions that are taken to deal with the issue. Analysing the process means for example looking at 
how the issues are defined and framed, what kind of options were considered as solutions and how 
these options were brought to the table.  
 
Cash et al. (2003) explains that scientific information used for scientific advice (as boundary object) 
has a higher chance of having an impact on ‘social responses to public issues’ if the information is felt 
to be credible (is the advice scientifically accurate), salient (to what extent is the advice relevant at 
this time) and legitimate (is the advice respectful and acceptable for all stakeholders) by all relevant 
stakeholders. This framework mentions three main functions that could improve effectiveness, which 
are communication, translation and mediation. The term communication refers to the frequency 
and timing of communication activities. Translation is intended to create a mutual understanding of 
terminology but also of underlying, discipline-specific ‘truths’ and rules. Mediation is intended to 
balance credibility, salience and legitimacy, as the theory recognises that improving one of the three 
usually decreases one or two of the other criteria.  
 
The indicator credibility is about the degree to which scientific knowledge is perceived to be adequate. 
Scientific advice is found to be credible when the information is based on peer-reviewed research and 
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when it is current and the best available knowledge at this time. Credibility can be improved by ‘active, 
iterative and inclusive’ communication and translation, if that results in a better understanding 
between decision makers and scientists. In situations where for example decision makers expect that 
their questions can easily be answered, when there is still a high level of uncertainty, the advice will 
be perceived as less credible. Also, if communication ceases for a period of time, there is a good 
chance that the information used by decision makers is not the current and/or best available 
knowledge (Cash et al., 2003, p. 8088). Cash et al. (2003) describes how credibility can be improved 
by including information from local stakeholders in addition to knowledge from scientists, if that 
ensures that the science used is applicable to the local circumstances. Scientists and local 
stakeholders can differ in what is considered to be a credible method: scientific experiments are often 
considered to be more credible when they are conducted in controlled and restricted situations, as 
those environments provide statistically more credible results, whereas local stakeholders often 
consider these ‘lab’-experiments to be theoretical and separate from real life situations.  
 
The indicator salience considers whether or not the advice is relevant for decision makers at this time. 
Scientific advice is perceived to be salient when the advice that is given provides answers to a 
problem that is on the political agenda, can be used to make decisions and is written in a language 
that is understandable for all stakeholders. Salience can be improved by ‘active, iterative and 
inclusive’ communication, as that ensures that scientists are aware of which questions are relevant for 
decision makers, and ensures that decision makers are aware of which questions can be answered 
by scientists. What is relevant for decision makers can change over time, and when a gap in 
communication occurs, scientists may end up answering old questions, while missing the questions 
that have become more relevant over time. A gap in communication can also result in the wrong 
assumptions of decision makers about which questions can easily be answered by scientists. In 
situations where local communities are not part of the conversation, or where local knowledge is not 
correctly translated to scientific knowledge, the results can be irrelevant for local communities if the 
advice has no connection with their realities. Salience can be improved by translation to provide 
information that is understandable for the different stakeholders. This means that peer reviewed 
articles for scientists and reports to decision makers are likely to be separate products (although 
based on the same research). 
 
Scientific advice is perceived to be legitimate when the production of information ‘has been respectful 
of stakeholders values and beliefs, unbiased in its conception and fair in its treatment of opposing 
views and interests’ (Cash et al., 2003, p. 8086). Legitimacy can be improved when the process 
leading to the advice was transparent for all stakeholders and by providing enough options for 
stakeholders to participate. Stakeholders that did not take part in the discussion are more likely to 
reject the advice (Cash et al., 2003, p. 8088), regardless of whether it was considered salient or 
credible.  
 
According to Cash et al. (2003) and other authors (e.g. Keller (2009)) the three main indicators 
(credibility, salience, legitimacy) are ‘highly coupled’ so ‘efforts to enhance one normally incur a cost 
to the others’. According to Cash et al. (2003) legitimacy is often balanced against credibility and 
salience. Allowing local communities to add information and influence the results (which increases 
legitimacy) can reduce perceived credibility (especially within the science domain) and salience. 
Mediation is the process of clarifying differences, finding common grounds, and aim for a result that is 
legitimate for all participants, without losing credibility or relevance. Mediation activities can include 
‘increasing transparency, bringing all perspectives to the table, providing rules of conduct, and 
establishing criteria for decision making’ (Cash et al., 2003, p. 8088). 
 
Mediation comes into play in situations where improved understanding (through communication and 
translation) in itself is not enough to solve conflicts, and is usually used to balance credibility, salience 
and legitimacy. Mediation manages the boundary between the science and policy domains through 
buffering and linking strategies (Cash et al., 2003; Keller, 2009). A boundary that is too porous can 
result in politicisation of science, making the advice legitimate but reduce its credibility. Buffering 
strategies are activities that maintain independence between the two domains. An example is to 
create separate publications for the science and policy domain, allowing the science to be peer 
reviewed without political interference. A boundary that is too rigid can result in an advice that is 
credible, but not considered salient and/or legitimate. Examples of linking activities are high 
transparency of procedure, creating a summary for policy makers, offering a public review of reports 
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and giving an important role to decision makers, for example in reviews of reports, participation in 
summary for policy makers, review of procedures or nomination of expert participants. 
 
2.3 Relation between effectiveness and possible roles 
 
The effectiveness of Pielke’s four roles is said to depend on whether an environmental problem is 
structured, moderately structured or unstructured (Broekhans & Turnhout, 2012; Hisschemöller, 
Hoppe, Groenewegen, & Midden, 2001; Hoppe et al., 2013), see Table 2. For structured problems, it 
is expected that the role of pure scientist or science arbiter are the most effective, as the problem can 
be solved by providing the knowledge that is needed to fix the problem. Due to consensus on values it 
is clear what problem needs to be solved, and due to consensus on what knowledge is needed, the 
solution can be found relatively easily. In the case of moderately structured problems, there is no 
consensus on values but there is agreement on knowledge. Examples are usually ethical issues, like 
genetic modification. In that case the role of mediator could be more effective, by exposing the 
complexity, finding common ground and negotiating an accepted solution. The focus in those cases is 
on adding factual knowledge and on discussing how that influences values. In the case of badly 
structured problems, there is agreement on values but not on knowledge. An example can be the 
issue around pesticides, where everyone agrees that the use of pesticides should be reduced, but 
stakeholders do not agree on the best way to achieve that. For those problems science is usually 
used by policy makers to back up their preferred solutions, which means that the scientists often 
(either voluntarily or not) end up in the role of advocate. In the case of an unstructured problem, like 
climate change, science alone is not going to provide the answers but according to Hisschemöller et 
al. (2001) science can be seen as a problem recogniser, by exposing the issue.  
 
Situations where the problem is characterised incorrectly are likely to cause tensions. This is most 
common when a problem is treated as structured but turns out to be unstructured (Hoppe et al., 
2013). Also, scientists in boundary organisations are more prone to accusations of stealth advocacy 
when they are dealing with unstructured problems with high levels of uncertainty in knowledge and 
large differences in values. This is because in these situations scientists have to choose between 
reporting the high levels of uncertainty (which can cause doubt about the policy choices) or remove 
some of the uncertainty by stating (elements of the) results as more factual than it is (which can 
reduce credibility of the underlying science) (Hoppe et al., 2013). 
 
Table 2. Roles vs problem type, based on Pielke (2007), Hisschemöller et al. (2001) and Broekhans 
and Turnhout (2012).  
  Consensus on values and basic goals? 
  No Yes 
Consensus on 
knowledge? 
No 
 
Unstructured (‘wicked’) problem 
 
 
Science as problem recogniser 
 
(Honest) Broker 
 
Moderately structured problem 
(ends) 
 
Science as advocate 
 
Issue Advocate 
Yes 
 
Moderately structured problem 
(means) 
 
Science as mediator 
 
Science Arbiter 
 
Structured problem 
 
 
Science as problem solver 
 
Pure Scientist & Science Arbiter 
 
The four roles of Pielke’s framework are likely to each score differently in one or more criteria for 
effectiveness (Table 3).  
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The role of pure scientist is likely to score high in the criterium of credibility, but much lower with 
respect to salience and legitimacy. This is entirely according to the intentions of a pure scientist, who 
feels that science should be unbiased and independent. Salience and legitimacy imply adjustment to 
relevant policy questions, and to values and needs of other stakeholders. 
 
Science arbiters will score high on credibility as well, but will also score higher on salience than the 
pure scientists. They will look at what is relevant for policy makers and explain their results to prevent 
misunderstanding. This meets the element of active and iterative communication and translation. It is 
possible that this role will not score too high on legitimacy, because the science arbiters will not 
actively be looking for other stakeholder views, values and perspectives.  
 
Issue advocates can score both high or low on salience. They will actively be part of the political 
debate, which can lead to high salience, but depending on their opinion they may or may not provide 
advice that is useful for decision makers. Whether or not they score high on legitimacy also depends 
on the opinion, but it is likely that they will have sided themselves with one particular group. That 
implies that the score for legitimacy is lower, because their opinion is not balanced and fair for all 
stakeholder views. It is likely that their credibility score is lower, but this can also depend on their 
reputation before taking the role as advocate.  
 
The honest broker is likely to score very high on legitimacy, because of the involvement of all relevant 
stakeholders, including policy makers. It answers to the desired actions around communication, 
translation and mediation in the framework of Cash et al. (2003). It is to be expected that the honest 
broker can score lower on credibility, because the end results are not purely based on peer-reviewed 
science but also on other knowledge, and on values. Also the honest broker has a higher risk 
(compared to pure scientists or science arbiters) of being considered to be an advocate, which could 
decrease credibility even more. Based on Pielke’s framework one can assume that the honest broker 
will score high on salience as well, partly because he will include policy makers in his conversations 
and partly because providing a range of solutions implies a better chance of including answers that 
the decision makers can work with. 
  
Table 3. Relation between the roles of scientists at the policy interface and criteria for effectiveness of 
their advice (based on Pielke (2007) and Cash et al. (2003)) 
Roles 
Effectiveness criteria 
Salience Credibility Legitimacy 
Pure Scientist Low Very High Very low  
Science Arbiter High Very High Low 
Issue Advocate Medium Low Low 
Honest Broker High Medium Very High 
 
In general this implies that the honest broker role is likely to more effective (when measured 
according to the framework of Cash), because it has a positive balance in all criteria. This 
corresponds to Pielke’s expectations. Huitema and Turnhout (2009) concluded that in practice this 
may not necessarily be easy to implement. Their analysis shows that a variety of roles was used 
within one boundary organisation: Science Arbiter, Honest Broker and Issue Advocate.  
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3 Methodology 
For this study a case study approach has been chosen based on an explanatory question, which is a 
type of case study that looks at “how or why did something happen?” (in contrast to a descriptive 
question that looks at “what is happening or has happened?”) (Yin, 2011). A definition for a case 
study is “An empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon (e.g., a “case”), set within its real-
world context—especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident “ (Yin, 2011, p. 2). A case study is especially relevant for ‘How’ and ‘Why’-questions, in 
contemporary situations that can be examined in context, where the behaviour cannot be manipulated 
by the study and where triangulation (use of multiple sources) is possible (Rowley, 2002).  
 
The MDBA is an appropriate case for this study, as during the development of the Basin Plan it can 
be seen as a boundary organisation for water management reform. The MDBA includes employees 
from both the scientific and the policy domain. As part of their work they created several boundary 
objects through which scientific advice was provided (more detail in chapter 4 and 5) that was 
intended to result in new policy for water management in the Murray-Darling Basin. As study object it 
has specific characteristics which make it an interesting case. One is that the MDBA is a newly 
formed organisation, with a clear mandate that starts with the development of the Basin Plan. This 
makes it a learning organisation, which resulted in (at least) two distinctive phases with different 
approaches. It differs from other studied cases within this program (Brehm, 2013; Van Nassou, 2014) 
in that water management in this case is not (just) about flooding but more about variability, and in the 
fact that it is in a different part of the world (Australia vs Europe), with a different government structure 
(federal and state governments vs national government). Also the process of the development of the 
Basin Plan was highly visible in the media, and has been widely discussed in academic literature 
(Wahlquist, 2011), which provides a rich data collection for this study to compare with interview data. 
Also, it is a case that happened long enough ago for participants to be able to reflect, but not that long 
ago that interviews suffer from faded memories.  
 
This study will use two methods of data collection: semi-structured interviews and secondary literature 
analysis. The main part of the analysis is based on semi-structured interviews. Initially eight key 
stakeholders have consented to participating in such an interview, followed by an additional three at a 
later date. The first eight interviews were live interviews, the other three were held through video 
conference or telephone, due to geographical distribution. Appendix B provides an overview of 
interview participants. Out of these eleven participants, seven were involved with the MDBA at the 
time of the development of the Guide, with four of them in the science domain. The other four 
participants are university scientists in respectively public policy, socio-economic sciences, natural 
resources and freshwater ecology. Interview questions can be found in Appendix A. They are based 
on the interview questions of Brehm (2013) and Van Nassou (2014), two other case studies in this 
research program. This is done to ensure consistency with the overarching program. Note: views 
expressed by the participants are their personal views, and do not necessarily reflect the views or the 
official position of their employer or organisation. 
 
Key documents for the secondary literature analysis were reports from the MDBA as boundary 
objects, the Water Act with definitions on the expected functioning of the MDBA, peer reviewed 
literature analysing the different reports and processes of the MDBA and media products like websites 
and newspaper articles. Apart from documents that relate directly to the case study, other peer review 
literature has been used with relation to the analytical framework (around boundary organisations, 
roles on the science-policy interface and effectiveness of scientific advice).  
 
Interviews have been recorded, transcribed and analysed based on the Analytical Framework. For the 
aim to establish the role used by the MDBA, analysis has focused on how the advice is formulated 
and presented, and on signs that show stakeholder engagement, attempts to broaden the range of 
solutions and advocacy. For the aim to establish effectiveness, analysis has looked for levels and 
direction of communication, translation & mediation, as well as perceived credibility, salience & 
legitimacy, and linking & buffering strategies. Several examples to these key indicators have been 
identified during a first reading of the interview transcripts. During a second reading more details of 
these examples have been collected. Secondary literature analysis of MDBA-reports, reports from 
scientists & scientific institutes and peer-reviewed articles about the development of the Basin Plan 
have looked at similar examples relating to these key indicators.  
  
 Boundary Work in the Murray-Darling Basin - p 26 
 
4 Background: Murray-Darling Basin 
This chapter gives a short overview of the geographical and economic characteristics of the Murray-
Darling Basin, and the history of its governance (section 4.1). This is followed by a more detailed 
description of the Water Act 2007 (Cth) , with a focus on the objectives and set up of the Murray-
Darling Basin Authority (MDBA); the requirements for the Murray-Darling Basin Plan as laid down in 
the Water Act; and on who were involved in the science production for the Basin Plan.   
4.1 History of the Murray-Darling Basin and its governance 
 
The Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) is the most important agricultural area of Australia (with 40% of the 
agricultural output), and houses 3.4 million people (in 
2006, including over 1 million people in Adelaide, the 
capital city of South Australia, and over 300,000 people 
in Canberra, the nation’s capital city), who are reliant on 
the water for irrigation, drinking water and recreation 
(Grigg, 2012). The Murray-Darling River is over 2,500 
km long (see Figure 2). The geography of the MDB has 
a great impact on how it should be managed. One 
element is that the elevation in the main floodplain is 
only 200 meters or less. A result of such a low gradient 
is that the flow is usually very slow, and the river 
channels have changed very often, leaving an intricate 
network of gravel and sand, which influences the 
groundwater system. Another element is that the shape 
of the Basin is like a very shallow bowl, which has 
resulted in a large amount of deposited material that 
can easily result in salination of the river water 
(Williams, 2011).  
 
The climate of the MDB has a high variability in rainfall, 
with severe droughts and heavy floods both within seasons or lasting for years (Connell & Grafton, 
2011, pp. 10-11). The ecosystem is dependent on these infrequent floods. Figure 3 shows the 
variability in the amount of GL/y that flow out of the Murray Mouth into the sea (Grafton, 2011, p. 249). 
It also shows the extremely low levels of flow between 2001 and 2009.  
 
Figure 3. Flows at the River Murray Mouth (GL/y) (Grafton, 2011, p. 249) 
 
Parts of the MDB are protected through a series of international treaties. Examples are the Ramsar 
Convention of Wetlands of International Importance (with 11 wetlands in the MDB on the list); the 
Convention on Biological Diversity; and some treaties on conservation of migratory species, waterbird 
species and biodiversity, especially in freshwater systems (Pittock & Finlayson, 2011).  
Figure 2. Map of Murray-Darling Basin 
(High Quality Australia, 2015) 
 Boundary Work in the Murray-Darling Basin - p 27 
 
 
Unsustainable use of the environment of the Basin has resulted in saline and dry floodplains 
(Williams, 2011), loss of biodiversity and ecological values (Lester & Fairweather, 2009), and in 
particular created environmental issues in the Murray estuary, the Coorong (Kingsford et al., 2011). 
This is largely due to overallocation of water for irrigation purposes (Finlayson, Davis, Gell, Kingsford, 
& Parton, 2011; Pittock & Finlayson, 2011). In particular, a period of severe drought in the beginning 
of the 21st century (the ‘millennium drought’) had a devestating effect on the environment, food 
production and local communities (Williams, 2011).  
 
The Murray-Darling River runs through four States in Australia (Queensland, New South Wales, 
Victoria and South Australia) and the Australian Capital Territory (hereafter called the Basin States). 
Water use in one State impacts the availability of water in States downstream. The Basin States hold 
jurisdiction over natural resource management, including water. South Australia as downstream state 
has a history of (unsuccessfull) attempts to secure agreements on water sharing with upstream states 
in the 19th century (Grigg, 2012). Originally South Australia used the Murray for river transport and 
required enough water for navigation. At the same time New South Wales and Victoria were 
developing irrigated agriculture and were not inclined to give that up. In general, the current political 
position of South Australia (as the most downstream state) is to have enough water in the Murray for 
a healthy environment and consumptive use, where states upstream use a large amount of water for 
irrigation. New South Wales has the highest over-allocation of water (Ross & Connell, 2014). It has 
been clear for a long time that overallocation of water can cause problems and that water 
management should involve cooperation of all Basin States (Connell & Grafton, 2011). Water is used 
for many purposes, including mining, manufacturing, construction and recreation or household 
activities, but in 2009 more than 80% of the water use was for agriculture (Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority, 2010). In 1915 the River Murray Agreement and the River Murray Commission were 
established, which was the first Australia-wide coordinated form of water management (Ross & 
Connell, 2014). More recently, in 1992, the Basin States formed the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement 
with the Murray-Darling Basin Commission (MDBC) and the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council. 
Changes in understanding of the complexity of water management in the MDB led in 2004 to the 
National Water Initiative, which had the intention to create a water management reform based on 
economic efficiency, environmental sustainability and community development (Ross & Connell, 
2014). One key set of instruments in water management is around water trading and water buyback. 
This involves selling water entitlements to other water users like irrigators (water trading) or to the 
government for environmental purposes (water buyback) (Bjornlund, Wheeler, & Cheesman, 2011). 
Another key element in the discussions around water management are the long-term average 
Sustainable Diversion Limits (SDLs), which represent an environmentally sustainable level of water 
use. A related number is the Environmentally Sustainable Level of Take (ESLT), which is the amount 
of water that can be extracted and used for human consumption (including agricultural and industry 
use) whilst keeping enough water to keep an environmentally healthy river system (Murray-Darling 
Basin Authority, 2015b).  
 
In 2007 the Australian Parliament passed the Water Act 2007 (Cth)  with the support of both the 
opposition and other minor parties (Boully & Maywald, 2011), which shows a high level of consensus 
between political parties. In 2008 the MDBC was superseded by the Murray-Darling Basin Authority 
(MDBA), which was part of the further water reform developments described in the Water Act 2007 
(Cth) 2.  
4.2 The Water Act and the MDBA 
 
The MDB Ministerial Council and the MDB Commission were comprised of representatives from the 
Basin States and the Commonwealth. The Basin States selected their own representatives. 
Information was collected by the Basin States and shared between jurisdictions. Decision making was 
based on consensus, so all Basin States and the national representatives had to agree. This 
consensus based decision making resulted in decisions that were considered credible and salient, 
                                                     
 
 
2 This is a simplification of a complex governance development. For more detailed information see for 
example Ross and Connell (2014). 
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and were supported by all parties. Examples of this are the Basin Salinity Management Strategy and 
the The Living Murray Programme (Ross & Connell, 2014). The downside of consensus based 
decision making, combined with the fact that the members of the Commission were representing their 
States and not the Basin as a whole, is that making decisions was a very slow process, and some of 
the more contested issues could not be decided on (Ross & Connell, 2014). Dr Pittock, Associate 
Professor, Fenner School of Environment and Society, Australian National University:  
“And of course being a consensus based organisation it had strengths and weaknesses, and 
a considerable strength was that once they agreed to something, it tended to happen and that 
the funding was shared. And the weakness was that it was decision making by lowest 
common denominator. And it took a very long time to reach decisions, and the decisions they 
reached were often compromises that did not fix the problem.” (Dr Pittock, Canberra, 30 Oct 
2014). 
 
Establishing the Water Act and changing the organisational structure to the MDBA was explained as a 
result of dissatisfaction from the politicians with the fact that the Basin States failed to agree on 
structural water reform measures (Byron, 2011; McKay, 2011) and to speed up the decision making 
process, which was intended to allow for a more comprehensive and faster water reform (Daniell, 
2011; Ross & Connell, 2014).  
 
The MDBA is a Commonwealth body, even though the Basin States (and not the national 
government) hold jurisdiction over water management. This was defended by using the international 
environmental conservation agreements as national obligations, allowing the Commonwealth 
government to take over some of the water management, as long as it is based on honouring these 
international treaties (Grigg, 2012). 
 
The functions of the Authority according to s.172 of the Water Act 2007 (Cth) include  
- measuring, monitoring and recording the quality and quantity of the Basin water resources and 
the condition of water-dependent ecosystems in the Basin,  
- supporting and conducting research and data gathering & sharing about water resources and use 
of water resources,  
- engaging and educating the Australian community  
- developing, or assisting development, of measures for the ‘equitable, efficient and sustainable 
use of the Basin water resources (inlcuding measures for the delivery of environmental water)’ 
and implement or coordinate implementation of these measures. 
 
Appointment of the members of the Authority3 is described in Division 2 of the Water Act 2007 (for 
more detail see Appendix C. Water Act 2007). Important to notice is that the members are expected 
to have a high level of expertise in one or more of these fields: water resource management; 
hydrology; freshwater ecology; resource economics; irrigated agriculture; public sector governance; 
financial management. This shows that knowledge in this selection of subjects is considered to be 
relevant and sufficient for the decision making process. Another important element is that Authority 
members cannot be involved in management of an interest group, representing a group of water 
holders or advocating a particular way of water management in the Basin. That implies that being part 
of one of these interest groups is expected to possibly decrease the impartiality of the decision 
making process. This clause shows that the aim of establishing this group is to have expertise and no 
pre-set values.  
 
The six-members of the Authority (decision makers) within the MDBA were selected by the 
Commonwealth, not by the Basin States, and officially did not represent the Basin States. However, 
unofficially the expectation existed that they did represent a State or interest group. Dr Young, water 
resources specialist in various roles in CSIRO and MDBA, explained:  
“I would assume, and my belief is, that as well as those criteria, they were selected because 
of their connections and representativeness across a number of stakeholder groups and 
across different geographies of the Basin. So it was important for them to think that they had 
                                                     
 
 
3 The Authority is also called the Board in other literature. In this thesis ‘the Authority’ refers to the six-
member board, whereas ‘Murray-Darling Basin Authority’ or ‘MDBA’ refers to the entire organisation.  
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members who were connected to communities in South Australia, or were from different parts 
of the Basin. The States would want to know that they had people from their jurisdiction on 
the Authority. Though my recollection is that the criteria and the legislation do not require that, 
it is just expertise based. (..) They certainly were announced according to their expertise, but I 
think it was clear from the announcements, and it was at least partial expectation that they 
were representing jurisdiction as well.” (Dr Young, 29 Jan 2015). 
 
Decision making in the Authority is based on majority voting instead of consensus, which, compared 
to the consensus-based decision making in the MDBC, was intended to allow for a faster decision 
making process (Ross & Connell, 2014) but can have negative impact on legitimacy. 
 
The MDBA is supported by several advisory committees. Two of these committees are described in 
the Water Act, which are the Basin Officals Committee and the Basin Community Committee. The 
latter is intended to advise the Authority about engaging the community and about other community 
matters with regards to Basin water resources (for more detail see Appendix C. Water Act 2007). The 
Water Act gives room for other advisory committees, such as the Advisory Committee on Social, 
Economic and Environmental Sciences (ACSEES, established in 2012), the Northern Basin Advisory 
Committee (NBAC, in 2007) and the Sustainable Diversion Limit Adjustment Assessment Committee 
(SDLAAC, in 2013).  
 
An important element of the Water Act is the requirement for the MDBA to develop a Murray-Darling 
Basin Plan. The Water Act describes in great detail the purpose and required contents of the Basin 
Plan. This section in the Water Act is the mandate under which the MDBA operated while developing 
the Basin Plan (see Appendix D. Water Act 2007 - Basin Plan). The first purpose (out of seven) of the 
Basin Plan (Section 20) is to give effect to relevant international agreements. This is the part that is 
necessary to give the Commonwealth the authority to take responsibility for water management, 
instead of the Basin States, and implied a strong environmental focus for the Basin Plan: 
“The States would not relinquish any of those [water management] powers, so the 
Commonwealth used the external affairs powers and the various treaties the country had 
signed up to, like the IPCC, the Convention on Biodiversity, the Ramsar convention etcetera, 
to pass the legislation. All of those treaties are essentially around international environmental 
obligations in one shape or form. So the legislation [the Water Act] had a strong 
environmental flavour and a strong environmental bias” (Dr Young, 29 Jan 2015). 
 
The second and third purpose also are around environmental elements (environmentally sustainable 
limits and environmental objectives). The fourth purpose asks for a way to use and manage the water 
resources ‘in a way that optimises economic, social and environmental outcomes’. Section 21 
describes in more detail the obligations with regards to the international agreements, specifically the 
Biodiversity Convention and the Ramsar Convention. As a result of the fact that the first three 
purposes are looking at the environment (give effect to international agreements, look for 
environmentally sustainabable limits and discuss the environmental objectives), the science 
underlying the Basin Plan started off by looking at research on ecology and environmental indicators.  
 
Another interesting part of the Water Act is Division 2, Subdivision E, which describes the procedure 
for making the Basin Plan. In short it says that the Authority, to start with, had to consult with the 
Basin Sates and the two advisory committees mentioned above, and any other consultation as 
deemed appropriate. After that they were to write a proposed Basin Plan, with a plain English 
summary, and invite submmissions from Basin States and members of the public. Part of this 
invitation included prescribed ways of publishing the proposed Basin Plan and its summary. After 
receiving submissions from Basin States and the public, the Authority was to publish the submissions, 
alter the proposed Basin Plan (including a report that outlines what is changed and what happened to 
the submissions) and present it to the Minister. The Minister then could ask for changes which the 
Authority follows up (Water Act 2007 (Cth), s. 41-44). Note that this procedure did not mention 
preparing and publishing a document with the science base before preparing a proposed Basin Plan. 
This therefore must have been included on the initiative of the Authority. Mr Freeman, Chief Executive 
and Member, Murray-Darling Basin Authority until September 2011, summarised this process as 
follows:  
“The science informs the Guide, the Guide then informs the proposed Basin Plan and then 
you move from a proposed Basin Plan to a Basin Plan, which is a political process.” (Mr 
Freeman, 7 Nov 2014). 
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This shows that, for the purpose of this research, the Guide can be seen as the main scientific advice 
from the Authority in the process of the development of the Basin Plan, with the proposed Basin Plan 
as first step moving into the final Basin Plan as a political document.  
 
Within the complex organisational structure of the MDBA, scientific expertise that contributed to the 
Basin Plan can be found at four locations4: 
- The first location is the six-member Authority itself, as this group was made up of scientists from 
different backgrounds, as required by the Water Act (see above). Several participants, including 
Mr Freeman, point out that these members are appointed based on expertise, although as 
mentioned earlier there was also the implication that appointments were balanced across the 
Basin States. Some participants had the impression that the members of the Authority had a wide 
variety of perspectives and values, which were difficult to reconcile.  
- Apart from the six-member Authority the MDBA employed a large group of scientists within the 
MDBA. These scientists were employed through normal competitive selection, based on their 
expertise.  
- As a third group the MDBA made extensive use of the national science agency, the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO, 2015).  
- Where necessary, for example if certain research could not be done internally or by CSIRO, or if 
certain knowledge existed elsewhere, some external consultants or contracters were hired, 
usually from a university. The normal tender and selection processes applied to these 
appointments, so appointments would normally have been based on both expertise and costs.  
 
As explained above, in the policy domain the main groups are: 
- Federal (Commonwealth) government, the Minister dealing with water management and several 
governmental agencies responsible for water management (explained above).  
- Upstream State governments (mainly Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria). Their historical 
point of view is to keep entitlements to use water for irrigated agriculture (explained above). 
- Downstraeam State government (South Australia). Their historical point of view is to maintain 
higher levels of water in the river, initally to support river transport and navigation, and more 
recently to support environmental health and to prevent salinisation (Government of South 
Australia, 2012).  
- Local governments of the main cities in the Basin. Their concern is mainly to have water for 
consumptive use (drinking water) (Government of South Australia, 2012). 
- Local government of the rural communities – see below.  
 
Apart from the scientists and political domain mentioned above, the following are the main 
stakeholder groups in the society domain involved in this water reform: 
- The upstream irrigators and the irrigation communities (e.g. in Victoria, New South Wales). In 
many rural communities irrigated agriculture is the driving economic factor, which means that 
changes in irrigated agriculture are expected to have significant impact on businesses, employees 
and often their families, whose income depends on the larger irrigators (Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority, 2010). The upstream groups agree that the environmental health of the river needs 
improvement, but in general they are reluctant to give up water licenses as they fear this would 
have a negative impact on the economic wellbeing of the communities. Also there is some 
concern about the fact that returning water to the environment can result in more flood events 
(Neales, 2012).  
- The downstream irrigators and irrigation communities (mainly South Australia). These are the first 
to feel the negative impacts of low flow, mainly through higher salinity, drought and otherwise 
general low water quality. As a result they are less reluctant to give up water licenses (and have 
often already made significant investments that resulted in lower uses of water) (Bjornlund et al., 
2011). 
                                                     
 
 
4 A fifth group involved in the science of the Basin Plan is the Advisory Committee on Social, 
Economic and Environmental Sciences (ACSEES). However, as it was only established in 2012, it 
falls outside of the scope of this case study.  
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- Other members of the rural communities less dependent on irrgated agriculture, for example 
camping owners. The position of these families varies: some are likely to be less reluctant to 
improve environmental health as this could result in other opportunities and higher income 
through for example recreation, where others are unhappy with the uncertainties (Neales, 2012).  
- Environmentalists and NGOs with an objective to improve environmental health of the river 
systems, including those who are involved in agreements like the Ramsar convention. These 
groups claim that infrequent flooding is essential to maintaining the environmental health of the 
river system (Williams, 2011).  
- Citizens of the larger cities that depend on drinking water from the Murray and Darling rivers. 
They are likely to approve of returning water to the environment, especially the citizens of 
Adelaide, as they are the first to feel the negative impacts of low flows (Government of South 
Australia, 2012).  
- Indigenous groups with an ancestral claim on lands within the Murray-Darling Basin. They have a 
long history of water management. Declining environmental health has a negative impact on the 
options of pursuing and maintaining their ancestral lifestyle. Indigenous groups also culturally feel 
a responsibility to care for the land of their ancestors, which means that they feel responsible for 
the environmental health of their lands (Jackson, 2011).  
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5 Development of scientific advice 
The development of the Basin Plan has been an ongoing process, starting with the Water Act in 2007 
(Water Act 2007 (Cth)), to the endorsement of the final Basin Plan (Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 
2012b) by the Minister of the Environment in 2012, and is still being modified today. Figure 4 provides 
an overview of the entire process from Water Act to endorsement by the Australian Parliament (left 
column). This case study will be looking at the early stages of the development of the Basin Plan, as 
explained in chapter 3. Therefore the scope of this case study is in the right column: the development 
of the first major boundary object which is the Guide to the Proposed Basin Plan (Murray-Darling 
Basin Authority, 2010), and the subsequent development of the first Draft of the Proposed Basin Plan 
(Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 2011). The right column in the timeline in Figure 4 gives an overview 
of the main events during that time.  
 
Jan-09
Jan-10
Jan-11
Jan-12
Jan-08
Dec-12
Oct-10
Dec-11
Dec-10
Resignation of Chair Mike Taylor Aug-12
Release of 
Altered Proposed Basin Plan
Mar-08
Water Act (2007) 
Formation of MDBA
Nov-12
amended Basin Plan signed off 
by Minister Tony Burke
Dec-08
Water Amendment Act 2008
Oct-10
Australian Government Solicitor claims that 
the plan should give equal weight to 
environmental, social, and economic impacts 
of proposed water cuts in water allocation
May-11
Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists 
withdraw their support
Oct-10
Release of the Guide 
to the Proposed Basin Plan
and start of consultation round
Oct-10
Announcement of parliamentary 
inquiry (Windsor Inquiry)
29/11/2012
MDBP passed 
In Australian Parliament
May-12
Proposed Basin Plan offered 
to state water ministers for review
Jun-11
Windsor inquiry claim that 4000 GL 
is unsustainable
Nov-11
Release of Draft Basin Plan with 2750 GL 
Development of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan
(Mar 2008 – Dec 2012)
Main events within the period of this case study 
(Oct 2010- Dec 2011)
 
Figure 4. Timeline of the development of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan. The left hand column is an overview of 
the long term process from formation of the MDBA in 2008 to the endorsement of the final Basin Plan in 2012. 
The right hand column is a more detailed timeline of the main events that fall within the period of this case study.  
5.1 The Guide 
 
The Water Act 2007 was adopted with near universal support in Parliament, and subsequently met 
with consensus from scientists and different stakeholder groups (citizens, irrigator communities) that a 
sustainable future for the Basin included a healthy environment (Bjornlund et al., 2011; Boully & 
Maywald, 2011; Miller, 2011). This implies the expectation that a comprehensive Basin Plan would be 
welcomed by all parties.  
 
The first product that was published was the Guide to the Proposed Murray-Darling Basin Plan 
(Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 2010). This document was intended to give an explanation of the 
science under the Basin Plan, and was accompanied by a series of supporting technical documents. 
It was not a policy document or a proposed Basin Plan in itself.  
 
The Water Act 2007 (Cth)  describes the requirements for the Basin Plan. Most interviewed 
participants agree that the Water Act was very detailed on what the Plan should do. However, not 
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everyone agrees that that meant they had a clear mandate. Different interpretations were for 
example: 
- Mr James, currently Executive Director, Policy and Planning Division for the MDBA, but who was 
part of the team developing the Water Act, explained that in his view the mandate was to develop 
a Basin Plan with the best balance between leaving water in the river as opposed to taking it out 
for consumptive use.  
- Dr Connell, Research Fellow, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, 
believed that the original brief was:  
“How do you create a water management plan that can deal with extreme variability, extreme 
droughts, and climate change?” (Dr Connell, Canberra, 29 Oct 2014).  
- Prof. Williams, Adjunct Professor, Australian National University, also founding member of 
Wentworth group of Concerned Scientists, expected that the Plan would look at:  
“How much water does the Murray Darling require to achieve a certain level of health, given 
the implications socially and economically?” (Prof Williams, Canberra, 29 Oct 2014). 
 
The interpretation and the approach chosen in the development of the Guide was that the Water Act 
was asking for a Plan that ensures environmental health and (given a range of options to ensure 
environmental health) choose the option that has the most positive (or least negative) social and 
economic impacts. The Foreword of the Guide explains:  
“The Water Act requires the Authority to determine the volume of water required to maintain 
and restore environmental assets, using best available science and the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development. Subsequently the Authority addressed the optimisation 
of environmental, social and economic outcomes.” (Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 2010, p. 
iii).  
In other words: environmental health comes first. Consistent with that expectation the conclusion in 
the Guide starts with four different scenarios that show that the amount of additional surface water 
needed for the environment lies between 3,000 and 7,600 GL/year. The Guide then continues with a 
social and economic analysis. One conclusion of the socio-economic analysis is that the impacts for 
the communities will vary considerably from community to community, depending on a whole range of 
factors like level of reliance on irrigated agriculture, resilience of a community, dominant type of crop 
(as some are more sensitive to water reduction than others) and the availability of other economic 
opportunities, but also on individual factors like age of and background of the farmer. The MDBA 
combined six different models to analyse the potential economic effects by looking at exposure (to 
stress or change) and sensitivity (level of dependence). However, these models all look at a regional 
scale, not a local scale. Local scale information was sought through surveys and the Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics – Bureau of Rural Sciences (ABARE-BRS) was 
asked to provide economic models on costs (ABARE-BRS, 2010; Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 
2010). These models calculated the impacts in reduced profit, fall in gross value of irrigated 
agriculture and a decline in basin employment (Grafton, 2011) after which the Guide concludes that 
the scenarios with reductions of more than 4,000 GL/year would not result in an optimisation of 
economic, social and environmental outcomes. So the main conclusion in the Guide is that the 
Authority intends to further examine scenarios with reductions between 3,000 GL/y and 4,000 GL/y for 
the Proposed Basin Plan.  
 
The fact that the Guide includes a series of possible solutions, conclusions and decisions in its advice 
means that the MDBA did not play the role of Pure Scientist or Science Arbiter. Those two roles both 
are characterised by the fact that the scientists or advisory group only provide facts, with or without 
explanation of those facts. The use of different scenarios corresponds with the role of Honest Broker, 
but the scenarios in the Guide were all in a similar direction, with the only difference being the exact 
number of the volume of water. It was not a range of different solutions, which is an essential 
characteristic of the role of honest broker. Also, up until the presentation of the Guide, stakeholders 
were not consulted. The honest broker would expect participation of other stakeholders before the 
science advice is formulated, to be able to include their needs in the process of developing a range of 
solutions. The success of the honest broker role relies on the ability of the scientist or advisory group 
to honestly try to incorporate all views and values, with the aim to broaden the range of solutions and 
improve acceptance of the advice. In this case it could, for example, have found different ways of 
dealing with the socio-economic impacts, which may have resulted in different range of acceptable 
volumes, in different ways of balancing water for the environment versus water for the economy or in 
different adaptive responses to expected impacts.  
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The conclusion is that the MDBA as organisation acted as an Issue Advocate. An important 
characteristic of Issue Advocates is that they steer towards one specific solution or set of solutions. In 
this case the Guide moves towards a limited set of solutions. The MDBA has drawn conclusions 
about the best solutions, excluded certain other options outside of that range, and excluded solutions 
in a different direction. The advocate feels that his expertise entitles him, or even requires him, to give 
his opinion about the best solution. In this case the MDBA had the mandate to include what they 
thought was the best solution, with priority for environmental health, and the Guide is the presentation 
of that solution, together with the knowledge on which that solution was based.  
 
The fact that the Authority as organisation acted as Issue Advocate does not mean that individual 
scientists, either internal, CSIRO or external scientists, chose the same role. Most of the interview 
participants (all but one) feel that scientists have mainly taken the role of Science Arbiter or Pure 
Scientist. Most of the information came to the Authority either through academic articles, reports 
(sometimes with additional explanation) and presentations from scientists. Mr Freeman agrees that 
the role of Science Arbiter was the most common role adopted. The Authority made the decisions, 
and technical scientists were allowed to give options and explanations, but they were not in control of 
the process. He also says it was a personal choice whether or not scientists would only deliver 
information or go down the path of developing options.  
 
Mr James confirmed that the role that was played by the internal scientists was what was intended by 
the Water Act. In his view the (internal) scientists were probably in favour of improving environmental 
outcomes, but he also thinks that this did not colour the advice that came through, and did not change 
the outcome. The scientists from CSIRO were in general seen as Science Arbiters, although 
sometimes even close to Honest Brokers. As Mr Young said:  
“Certainly from the national science agency we would not advocate for a policy position, so 
we would assess options, look at the relative merits” (Mr Young, 29 January 2015). 
With regards to the external scientists, they themselves also feel that they mainly took the role of 
Science Arbiter. For example, Dr Connell mentions that the science was presented to the policy 
makers:  
“through very detailed briefings, lots of discussion, there would have been a lot of effort made 
to make sure the policy makers understood what they were being told, it was not just a large 
tome being dropped on the desk and they walked out” (Dr Connell, Canberra, 29 Oct 2014).  
Dr Pittock had a similar experience when he was invited to come to the MDBA to give a presentation. 
Several participants emphasised that scientists had the intention to not let their opinions influence 
their scientific results. For example, Dr Connell mentioned that, despite having an opinion, scientists: 
“made an enormous effort to not be an advocate” (Dr Connell, Canberra, 29 Oct 2014). 
 
Both Mr Freeman and Mr Young said that that there was not enough time to write the Guide:  
“Part of what the riding instructions on the Authority were, was to put together a Basin Plan in 
a year or a year and a half. And in the end the whole process took four years, and partly 
because it was complicated, but partly because trying to do it in a year, made it worse. Trying 
to do it quickly, led to a whole lot of problems that then took time to unpack, and mend the 
damage. Both in terms of relationships and redoing some of the work.” (Mr Young, 29 Jan 
2015). 
Especially the integration of the different separate issues needed more time than planned, because, 
according to Mr Freeman, it turned out to be much more complicated than anticipated. As a result, 
such integration was not done properly in the Guide. One element for the complexity of the integration 
is due to differences in scale. The ecological research in most cases was focused on small scale 
areas, but the social and economic data was only available on a large scale. It was difficult, in some 
cases impossible, to extrapolate the ecological scale to a Basin-wide level, but just as difficult to 
downscale the social and economic data. Also, due to the fact that the Commonwealth was a 
relatively new player in a natural resources management area that was previously the responsibility of 
the Basin States, the MDBA was still a learning organisation. All this meant that, according to Mr 
Freeman, it took longer for the MDBA to create the Guide than expected. Mr Young recognised that 
the fact that the MDBA, being a Commonwealth organisation, was a new player, which gave it 
opportunities but also created a barrier:  
“Everybody knew this was new and difficult, and they were thinking laterally and the 
environmental watering plan and many other aspects, I think, had innovative dimensions in 
there, which was taking Basin environmental water management certainly to a new level. That 
said, the timeframes and the political context did not create the best environment for 
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innovation, because people were under a lot of time pressure. And they knew they were doing 
a very difficult job that was resented by many people, which is not a great environment for 
driving innovation. (Mr Young, 29 Jan 2015). 
 
The main reason that time was limited was the millennium drought. This created a sense of panic and 
caused a cry for drastic measures. The MDBA was created in that panic, and even though it was not 
intended as a short term response to provide quick solace, it was still caught up in the feeling of 
urgency of that time. This had a positive impact on salience, as the questions that were answered 
were relevant for decision makers, but created pressure with regards to timely delivery.  
 
The MDBA was well funded. Nearly all participants agree that the amount of funding was, or should 
have been, sufficient. Some participants feel that scientists usually ask for more time, more research 
and more information, but that that is inherent to the nature of doing research. The main problem 
mentioned is that it was not easy to find the answers to the questions, despite there being enough 
resources. As Mr Alexandra, Senior Executive Ecosystem management and National Resource 
Manager, MDBA (until February 2013), mentioned:  
“More and more biophysical studies do not necessarily get you more useful policy decisions.” 
(Mr Alexandra, 14 Nov 2014). 
And: 
“And the difficulty that I experienced was that there were many people who thought that the 
answers could be found in a positive sense, that you could actually find them through 
examination of the material world, where my personal view was that we were dealing with a 
social dilemma, where choices were being made on behalf of the society, and that there is no 
ultimate correct answer.” (Mr Alexandra, 14 Nov 2014). 
This was also recognised by other academics: 
“Campbell (2010), Ison (2007) and Myers (2010) have also commented that the problem [of 
water management in the MDB] has been constructed in an unhelpful way: as a technical 
issue, in which a small number of scientists will work out the ‘right’ answer, announce what 
the rest of society has to do then all interested parties will do as instructed. This is very 
deterministic and authoritarian.” (Byron, 2011, p. 386). 
 
The above comments and the mandate in the Water Act imply that scientists and policy makers at the 
start of the process expected the problem to be moderately structured but realised later that it was an 
unstructured problem (see also section 2.1 and for further elaboration section 6.2)  
 
Some participants comment that the scope of the Guide, as laid out in the Water Act, is too narrow 
because the MDBA primarily looks at water quantity, and not at any other indicators. According to Dr 
Pittock, the Water Act has narrowed the scope of the water reform to a discussion about volumes and 
water quality, where in the past programs to manage the health of an ecosystem, like revegetation 
projects, were part of the scope. Dr Elsawah, Research Fellow at the University of New South Wales, 
also felt that there was too much focus on water quantity:  
“This should not be the message. It’s not about the number, because the number will change 
according to changes in the environmental conditions. What is sustainable now is not 
sustainable tomorrow. I guess the message should have been reframed more on how we can 
transform into a better future and how we can transform the industry, the government 
arrangements in place, so we are more adaptive under different changes. (…) And giving 
people a sense that it’s all about the number actually is a risky business. Because you tell 
people we will get the number right. But what will happen in five, six years’ time when we 
have another severe drought and it turns out that the numbers were not right. That’s the 
problem.” (Dr Elsawah, 31 Oct 2014). 
Prof Williams argues that the Basin Plan is looking at the wrong solutions. He feels that the funds 
should have gone to managing the structural adjustment of the communities, which, according to Prof 
Williams, is shown to be feasible in Grafton and Jiang (2010). Prof Williams also finds that the focus 
on these numbers meant that not enough information was given in the Guide about the infrastructure, 
how the river is engineered and, for example, how many bridges and properties will be flooded as a 
result of the recommended SDLs.  
 
According to Mr Freeman the limitation to the range of solutions is for a large part the result of the 
limited responsibility of the MDBA. This is related to the fact that jurisdiction for water reform originally 
lies with the Basin States. The Basin States and the MDBC used to manage a broad natural resource 
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program, including catchment management and ecosystem health, resulting in jointly funded projects 
like the Living Murray program. The mandate for the MDBA is limited to water quantity. As a result the 
sense of co-ownership has diminished and the goodwill and buy-in of state-level programs have 
diminished (Byron, 2011).  
 
One of the issues with regards to the political domain as mentioned by Mr Freeman is that he feels 
that the politicians underestimated the impact the Basin Plan would have on the communities: 
“I just do not think that politicians had gotten their head around that the BP was such a 
significant issue to so many people. Most people do not understand the integration, so the 
Authority was saying to the government: this is going to have quite a community backlash, 
because people will be able to see the impacts into their communities, but the government did 
not understand that. They thought it was a water plan, how can it do that? “(Mr Freeman, 7 
Nov 2014). 
Not only the Commonwealth government, but the local politicians and representatives too 
underestimated the likely impact, according to Prof Williams:  
“I’d go to the Living Murray discussions and talked to people about the Murray, and they were 
talking about saving the world with five hundred gigalitres. And I said: you cannot. Just sit 
down and work out: simple volume is area times depth. Just apply that formula.” (Prof 
Williams, Canberra, 29 Oct 2014). 
The fact that the local politicians and the Commonwealth government underestimated the likely 
impact means that they had other expectations from the scientific advice. It can be argued that this 
shows reduced salience: the advice does not fit with their realities. It also shows reduced legitimacy, 
as the advised higher volume is likely to be seen as unfair and unbalanced if they expect a lower 
volume to be sufficient.  
 
As explained in chapter 4.2, the Guide was intended to provide the scientific knowledge used for 
decision making later in the process. This implies that credibility is an important factor during 
development of the Guide: scientific knowledge that is not considered to be credible would provide a 
weak base for the remainder of the process. 
 
Peer review is important for credibility, because it provides transparency into the methods and results 
of specific elements of research, which makes it easier to understand and accept the knowledge as 
the truth. Peer review is in general an important element in the academic process because it allows 
academic transcripts and research reports to be reviewed by other experts, to assess the quality of 
the research and conclusions. The science behind the Guide was peer-reviewed early 2010 by two 
independent reviews. One of them was a review by national experts, the other a review by an 
international expert panel (Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 2015a). According to the MDBA both 
reviews proved that the best available science was used. Mr Freeman claims that all science is peer 
reviewed:  
“Basically any element of the BP that went to the Authority had to be peer reviewed. So there 
were always individual scientists selected to peer review based on whatever the issue 
was.”(Mr Freeman, 7 Nov 2014).  
Others within the MDBA explained that all individual parts of the research were adequately peer 
reviewed, but often internally, and that a large part of the science in the Guide was based on 
collecting existing (peer reviewed) literature. A point of critique from most of the external scientists 
about peer reviewing is that it either was not done properly or that the results were not published in 
full. Dr Pittock says that the MDBA did send a lot of material off to be peer reviewed, but that the 
reviews themselves were never released. He says:  
“I’ve got no idea what the range of comments was, and how they picked through them to be 
able to turn around and say: well, we’ve met those peer review standards.” (Dr Pittock, 
Canberra, 30 Oct 2014).  
The fact that the peer reviews were not open and transparent, and that nothing was made available 
until the official release of the Guide, has amongst the scientists resulted in the perception that the 
science in the Guide was a ‘backroom’ operation between CSIRO and the MBDA. Mr Freeman 
recognises this sentiment and feels that this is caused by the complexity of the integration:  
“If you are talking about individual elements [of the science], I think then the scientific 
response was, 'Yes, I think that it is correct’. It was when you started to synthesise all that, 
then there was a lot of divergence between the scientists. It was complex, and because they 
were not involved to the extent that they could have been, the scientists were generally 
saying, ‘Look I do not understand it and I'm not sure it's right’. " (Mr Freeman, 7 Nov 2014). 
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This lack of transparency with regards to peer reviews reduced credibility, because external scientists 
were not confident about the quality of the science.  
 
According to Cash et al. (2003) another way to improve credibility is the use of best available 
knowledge. One example mentioned where scientists during the interviews critiqued that not the best 
available knowledge was used concerns climate change. The Guide explains that the Authority 
intends to add an allowance for climate change in the Guide, which was a suggested 3% reduction in 
consumptive use over a ten year period, as buffer for anticipated impacts of climate change. Dr 
Pittock says:  
“And the logic there was that CSIRO estimates of average surface water availability under the 
median scenario would fall by around 12% over 40 years from 1990 to 2030, but note that this 
was median. (…) The median scenario simply meant it was their [CSIRO’s] middle scenario 
and did not mean it was the most likely scenario or the average scenario. They did a whole lot 
of other runs, here, and they had scenarios that ranged from 7% more water to 37% less. So 
the government just said, oh, median equals most likely, that’s what we’ll use for planning.” 
(Dr Pittock, Canberra, 30 Oct 2014). 
Not using the best available science with regards to climate change reduced credibility.  
 
However, several interview participants from the MDBA emphasised that using the established body 
of science has been very important in selecting science that was adequate for use in the Guide, and 
later for the Basin Plan. Some MDBA participants explain that in their opinion the established body of 
science is science that is peer reviewed, published and has a high level of consensus. They 
concluded that using the established body of science meant that the science for the Basin Plan had to 
exclude science with a (high) level of uncertainty and science that is innovative or ‘cutting edge’, as 
new science cannot be established yet. A key element in the framework from Cash et al. (2003) is 
that translation is important to bridge the gap between what is considered credible by scientists and 
what is considered credible by policy makers. This includes the fact that scientists have a tendency to 
point out uncertainties, where policy makers prefer clear answers. In this case, emphasis on the 
established body of science could result in excluding relevant knowledge when there is still 
uncertainty. It must be said that not all MDBA participants felt this strong about only including the 
established body of science, and excluding new science. Also, the focus on established science was 
mainly intended for external, not necessarily for internal scientists: the MDBA employed scientists 
themselves, at least some of whom did new research that was not always published and peer 
reviewed, but still used in the process of the development of the Guide. Local knowledge is not peer 
reviewed and published, and therefore not part of the established body of science. Even though this 
did not come up explicitly during the interviews, this could explain why knowledge from local 
communities was not sought during the development of the Guide. In short using the ‘established 
body of science’ is intended to increase credibility, but can reduce credibility by excluding innovative 
science and local knowledge. Excluding local knowledge can reduce legitimacy as well. 
 
Excluding local communities at this stage was a deliberate choice during the development of the 
Guide. The Guide was seen as a technical document that would publish the science that would be 
used for the development of the draft policy documents. Local stakeholders were not to be engaged 
before the presentation of the Guide, but they would be given the opportunity to add their knowledge 
and feedback after the scientists had given their input without influence from others outside the 
science domain (Daniell, 2011). This was intended to increase credibility. 
 
The organisational structure, as set up by the Water Act, also did not promote including local 
knowledge in the Guide. The Commonwealth is responsible for policy development and the Basin 
States responsible for implementation. The Basin States had been responsible for water management 
for decades, and the Commonwealth responsibility was new, so as a result the Basin States generally 
had more historical and local knowledge than the Commonwealth-level MDBA. Not all of this 
information was shared. The general consensus from interview participants is that that is because the 
Basin States were not unconditionally happy with what was considered by some as a Commonwealth 
take-over of the Basin States’ responsibility for water management. As Mr Alexandra said about the 
MDBA compared to the MDBC:  
“Most commentators and observers of the process would say it was much less collaborative 
because it was Commonwealth driven and less state driven, it was much more closed shop: 
government coming up with an answer and then going out, rather than a journey, partnership 
with the community.” (Mr Alexandra, 14 Nov 2014) 
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Something that is also pointed out by some participants is that the MDBA is responsible for 
developing the Basin Plan, but is not responsible for implementation of the Plan. Mr Freeman feels 
that it would have opened up more options if the MDBA also had been responsible for 
implementation, or if it could have used expertise of the States in engineering and changing the water 
management regime, to create a more optimal outcome. Mr Freeman says: 
“I think it needs to be a more integrated process where as this is a sort of interfaced process 
rather than integrated” (Mr Freeman, 7 Nov 2014).  
Although being responsible for implementation is not a necessary characteristic of a boundary 
organisation, the fact that the communication between the MDBA and the States was at this point in 
time mostly one-way (from MDBA to the States) instead of iterative and inclusive (as recommended 
by Cash et al. (2003)), did have a negative impact on the credibility and legitimacy of the advice, 
because the consequences of the proposed measures were not clear. 
 
With regards to translation (another key element from Cash et al. (2003) to improve effectiveness), 
the MDBA put a lot of effort in providing reports with different focuses for different stakeholder groups, 
including management summaries, technical reports and a ‘plain English summary’ for most of the 
key documents. The MDBA also provided a large database with all available knowledge through their 
website (Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 2013). This was intended to improve credibility through 
transparency. During the interviews it turned out that MDBA staff members were quite proud of this 
but some felt that it was not appreciated enough by the external scientists. This was probably true. As 
Prof Williams explained:  
”When we said that the science was not there they [the MDBA] were saying: “Have a look at 
the website” and that was disgraceful, for people who knew what they were talking about.” 
(Prof Williams, Canberra, 29 Oct 2014).  
This example shows that the effect of communication depends on the method of presenting the 
information. In this case the information was intended to improve credibility and transparency, but the 
method of communication did not fit the culture of the recipient, which meant that it did not have the 
intended effect.  
 
But despite these points of critique, when asked directly, most external scientists participating in the 
interviews considered the science in the Guide to be credible. Reasons mentioned are that they 
respect the researchers and staff at CSIRO, and expect them to provide credible work, but also 
because they agreed with the conclusions in the Guide. For example, the Wentworth group, who did a 
similar analysis somewhat earlier, arrived at a volume of 4,400 GL/y (Wentworth Group of Concerned 
Scientists, 2010). As that is close to the range presented in the Guide, they were satisfied with the 
conclusions and considered the science credible.  
5.2 After publication of the Guide 
 
It is widely recognised that the communication around the Guide was not handled well. 
The Guide was presented to the public on a Friday afternoon (8 October 2010), and the content of the 
Guide was kept secret until the last moment (Wahlquist, 2011, p. 129). The launch of the Guide itself 
was announced as an event. 
 
There had been almost no consultation with the local communities before the presentation of the 
Guide. The MDBA called for a consultation round after release of the Guide, with an invitation to all 
stakeholders to respond to the Guide and a planned series of visits to local communities for 
discussion meetings. The Foreword of the Guide asks for input from the community in response to the 
conclusions in the Guide:  
“In developing proposals for surface-water SDLs5, the Authority explored a number of 
scenarios to understand the trade-offs between risk to the environment and social and 
economic effects. While all the scenarios considered meet the objectives of the Water Act, the 
Authority is aware that they also have significant social and economic implications. With this 
in mind the Authority is seeking the views of the community and stakeholders on a range of 
possible SDLs.” (Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 2010, p. iii). 
                                                     
 
 
5 Sustainable Diversion Limit, see chapter 4.1 
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Prof Williams explained how absence of early consultations had resulted in the wrong expectations, 
which resulted in reduced salience and reduced legitimacy:  
“They all thought they could fix it with a hundred gigalitres or something. I can remember 
sitting, and I had a role at this time as commissioner trying to give advice on the red gum 
forests in New South Wales, which were key part of what we were trying to solve, and I 
remember sitting in a meeting with a fairly senior woman and she said, oh, it’s really good 
John, we have a hundred gigalitres of water to put into the forest, and I said, did you sit down 
and work out how that deep that water would be over the red gum forest? She never worked it 
out. She never thought about it, and it always had been a number. And when she did she 
realised, you know, you need a magnitude, and she was shocked. And she realised that all 
the conversations her people had been having with the government had all been on the 
wrong scale. And if they had known that the number was so big, there would have been much 
more debate about it right up front.“ (Prof Williams, Canberra, 29 Oct 2014). 
And further on:  
“There was no preliminary engagement where people were asked and helped to show what 
the numbers might look like. They were shocked.“ (Prof Williams, Canberra, 29 Oct 2014). 
 
The consultation round that followed immediately after the presentation of the Guide started at two 
communities (Griffith and Renmark). These communities in general were likely to be very critical 
towards the general idea of the Basin Plan, and strongly rejected the Guide. Wahlquist (2011) claims 
that the MDBA could have set a different tone by starting the consultation round at towns that were 
more positively engaged (e.g. Murray Bridge in South Australia). Opponents of the Basin Plan had 
already engaged with the media before the presentation. The media, in general being more inclined to 
report on conflicts, had a strong focus on the negative effects, and mainly reported the objections 
during those consultations in catching phrases (Wahlquist, 2011). Media coverage in the first few 
days included pictures and videos of local citizens burning the report; headlines like ‘Knockout blow’ 
(Rolfe, 2010) and ‘Plan will “save river, kill towns”’(Vasek & Wilson, 2010); and weekend edition 
articles claiming that the Plan would wipe out towns, large parts of the agriculture industry and would 
result in job loss and high food prices. Even the press in South Australia was mainly negative: the 
Advertiser (who had actively campaigned for a healthy river (Wahlquist, 2011)) recognised the State 
would benefit from increased environmental river health, but expressed concerns that the South 
Australian irrigators would face even higher cuts than upstream industries. SA senator Nick Xenophon 
was quoted as: "When it comes to the Murray, we have long been treated like a poor cousin. This 
plan, if implemented, will turn that policy into practice.” (Kelton, 2010). Only a small part of those 
articles discussed the aim of the proposed measures: restoring environmental health (for example 
only 600 out of 5000 words on this topic in The Australian the day after the presentation of the Guide) 
(Wahlquist, 2011). This means that more emphasis was given on the arguments against the Guide 
than on the benefits of the Basin Plan. Wahlquist (2011) suggests that it would have been better to 
give journalists more information beforehand. Daniell (2011) shows that town hall meetings were not 
the right method for two-way communication, but are better used for providing a limited set of 
information to large groups of stakeholders at low costs. This mainly added to the frustration and 
inflamed rather than calmed down the participants (Daniell, 2011). Several interview participants 
confirmed this. They also explained that some members of the local communities did provide positive 
feedback on the Guide, but usually in a more discrete way (for example through private text 
messages) as they were concerned about what their neighbours would think. Boully and Maywald 
(2011) argue that the Authority tried to engage with the community in ‘a logical and rational manner’, 
but failed to engage with the emotions underlying social and economic matters ‘as fundamental to an 
individual’s survival as the water itself’. Daniell (2011) explains that, as this came after an 
organisational structure with more options for stakeholder input (during the MDBC period prior to the 
MDBA), community representatives were already disappointed. The resulting fear and perceived loss 
of control led to loss of confidence in the process by local communities (Boully & Maywald, 2011, p. 
107 & 109). It also led to a sense of injustice, which includes ‘lack of recognition of impact, lack of 
consultation, lack of respect for local knowledge and lack of recognition for contribution to society as 
an agricultural community’, with as possible underlying motives, for example, ‘protection of interests of 
community, protection of livelihood, to maintain structural stability of the community and confidence in 
the future’ (Gross, 2011, p. 158). A survey from Bjornlund et al. (2011) showed that after the 
presentation of the Guide, most of the upstream irrigators became less accepting of environmental 
needs: the percentage of irrigators that agreed with an environmental allocation of water declined 
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from 60 to 43 percent in Victoria and from 55 to 44 percent in New South Wales. Also between 1998 
and 2011 the willingness of these irrigators to give up water to improve environmental flows declined 
from 30 to 10 percent for irrigators in New South Wales and Victoria (Bjornlund et al., 2011, p. 296). 
This shows a very low score on legitimacy in these States. In contrast to the percentages in New 
South Wales and Victoria, in 2010-2011 nearly 80 percent of the irrigators in South Australia agreed 
with the need to increase water for the environment, despite the fact that they faced considerable cuts 
as well.  
 
The drought had both a negative and positive influence on the effectiveness of the advice. At the start 
it was a major driver behind the onset of the Water Act and the Basin Plan. However, as the drought 
broke (in most areas it started to rain again) while the Basin Plan was still in development, the feeling 
of urgency for water reform was gone by the time the Guide was presented. At the same time 
communities were still in the process of recovering from the drought, and the proposed measures 
were expected to have a negative impact on their recovery. Prof Williams:  
“At the time these communities were in crippled condition, with the drought, and then to have 
this come along, the water reform, it was like kicking a man on crutches.” (Prof Williams, 
Canberra, 29 Oct 2014). 
In December 2010 and early 2011 major floods caused considerable damage, mainly in Queensland. 
It is more difficult to argue the need to return water to the environment during flood events than it is 
during a prolonged drought. This confused discussions about water reform, and especially the effects 
of climate change, even more (Mulligan, 2011, p. 136). 
 
Mr Freeman explained that part of the reason a (large) part of the community rejected the Guide is 
because it did not include information about what these plans meant for the local communities. This 
was, according to Mr Freeman, mainly due to the division of responsibilities, with implementation 
falling in the lap of the Basin States. So Mr Freeman felt that, when people started to ask what it 
meant for them, the MDBA could not answer that question, because that was not their job:  
“The Authority has responsibility for the proposed plan, but the community does not want to 
hear about a plan if they do not also hear about what's going to be the response. So the 
community does not accept going along and asking, well how will this be dealt with and we'd 
respond, that's not an issue for the Authority and that it will be dealt with by the Department, 
or the States or someone else. That's not an acceptable response to a community, as the 
community does not care, you know, whether it's local government or state government or 
federal government. They just see it as one big thing called government and they are 
expecting a more comprehensive response than, "Oh, that is not my job." Which is sort of 
what happened, as the Authority was not supported by the States and was not supported by 
the Commonwealth government. So it was left out there to tell half of the story, while the 
community and industry wanted to hear the whole story. But of course the Authority was not 
responsible for the other half of the story.” (Mr Freeman, 7 Nov 2014). 
Not only the local communities were taken by surprise, the decision makers were as well. Dr Pittock:  
“So when [the scientists] came back and said, something like, 3200 -7200 GL need to be 
returned from consumptive use to the river systems, so something like a third to 60% of the 
consumptive water needs to go back to make the system healthy, the bureaucrats tossed that 
away here. Had a melt-down. Because they badly managed that engagement with the 
stakeholders and the communication and interaction with the public, they then went on to the 
back foot and the political pressure came on to start backing off those higher figures for 
reallocating water.“ (Dr Pittock, Canberra, 30 Oct 2014). 
This surprise is also reflected by the political response as explained in section 5.3. The fact that the 
policy domain was surprised by the content of the Guide shows reduced salience and legitimacy, 
resulting from limited communication between decision makers and scientists.  
 
Some of the confusion also came from perceived ‘false confidence’ in the Guide. The Authority clearly 
states at several locations in the Guide that the socio-economic data may not be sufficient to provide 
a comprehensive prediction of possible impacts, but further on says it is confident in its judgement 
(Miller, 2011, p. 196). This reduced credibility.  
 
Several participants have examples or arguments to show that the negativity around the Guide was in 
some cases either incorrect or not as bad as reported. Members in the local communities did not all 
have the same opinion, but most of the feedback was coming from a select group of dominant and 
powerful irrigators. In contrast to the negative feedback, there was also positive feedback but much 
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less visible. MDBA participants mentioned that during the consultation round statements of approval 
were received via other channels than the public consultation meetings.  
 
Another point made by several interview participants was that the negative response from the public 
was not due to the science in the Guide (as one participant pointed out: they never had the time to 
read the report before they burned it) but the lack of transparency. Also it was to be expected that 
some of the irrigators would not have agreed with anything that would limit their water availability, and 
lashed out at the recommendations in the Plan regardless of the science. This implies that legitimacy 
was lower than credibility.  
5.3 Development of the Draft 
 
The Authority intended to use the knowledge base as presented in the Guide and the feedback from 
the consultation round to create a Proposed Basin Plan, which would lead to the final policy document 
(the actual Basin Plan). However, after the strong rejection of the Guide, there were concerns that the 
conclusions in the Guide were not acceptable.  
 
The public backlash to the Guide led to discussions about the mandate of the MDBA. Tony Burke, 
federal Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, ordered a 
Parliamentary Inquiry into the socio-economic impacts (called the Windsor inquiry) a week after the 
presentation of the Guide. In June 2011 the Windsor inquiry decided that 4,000 GL/y was 
unsustainable for local communities, and that it was not needed for the environmental health of the 
system (Windsor, 2011). The Minister asked advice from the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS) 
about the interpretation of the mandate. This focused on the fact that the main objective of the Water 
Act is to implement several international treaties, which was interpreted in a way that gave preference 
to environmental health. The AGS ruled that the plan should give equal weight to environmental, 
social and economic impacts of proposed cuts in water allocation (instead of the previous 
interpretation of environment first, and social and economic impacts second), because the 
interpretation of the AGS was that those treaties provided enough room to include social and 
economic impacts (Kildea & Williams, 2011). A week after the presentation of the Guide, the Authority 
itself started to question the validity of their own data on social science (Quiggin, 2011, p. 321), which 
had a negative impact on credibility. 
  
This resulted in a shift in the alignment of the Authority, from environmental values as priority to 
balancing environmental, social and economic values. The Chair of the MDBA, Mike Taylor, 
announced his resignation early December. It is believed that the main reason for his resignation was 
his disagreement with the new interpretation where the environment was not the main driver, and that 
he did not want to make further compromises towards a lower SDL (Wahlquist, 2011, pp. 126, 127). 
His successor as Chair, Craig Knowles, who is a former member of a Labor Government in New 
South Wales, was considered to be more ‘attuned to the political realities’ (Quiggin, 2011, p. 319). He 
immediately supported the new interpretation. The South Australian communities living downstream 
expressed concerns that a former New-South Wales politician would not fully understand the needs of 
the downstream communities (Wahlquist, 2011, p. 128).  
 
In May 2011 the MDBA publicly adopted the new approach, which was expected to lead to a lower 
amount of water that needed to be returned to the environment (Wilson, 2011, 26 May). That same 
month the Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists withdrew their support for the Murray-Darling 
Basin Plan, claiming they would not support a plan that would not solve the problems and reinforcing 
that a minimum of 4,000 GL/y should be returned to the environment. The CEO of the MDBA, Rob 
Freeman, resigned per 1 June 2011 for personal/family reasons. He was replaced by Dr. Rhondda 
Dickson. 
 
After the Guide, the MDBA continued working on the Draft Basin Plan. Because of the backlash to the 
Guide, the MDBA changed their process in two ways: they worked on repairing the relationship with 
stakeholders and local communities, and they internalised a large part of the science that was 
previously done by the CSIRO.  
 
The main method to improve relationship with stakeholders and local communities was the 
consultation round. The question is whether, at this stage, the feedback from the consultation round 
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could be considered to be constructive feedback, considering the fact that the more outspoken parts 
of the community, especially the larger irrigators, had a very negative attitude towards the Guide.  
Daniell (2011) also pointed out that something like town hall meetings in general are more useful for 
providing one-way information than as a two-way communication method. Scientists were for a large 
part not involved in the stakeholder consultation, except in some cases to explain/defend their science 
to local communities at information sessions. In addition to the town hall meetings, as described in the 
previous section, the Guide asked for written feedback from all stakeholders. The feedback received 
during and after the consultation round was published in a report and used for the Draft. Apart from 
the option to provide feedback, local knowledge was not actively sought or included. Despite the fact 
that the options for communication were still limited, one-way and not iterative, both legitimacy and 
salience in this stage were improved compared to the process of the development of the Guide, when 
communication was almost non-existent.  
 
To improve the integration between different disciplines the MDBA internalised a large part of the 
modelling, as done by CSIRO in the previous stage. This was considered necessary, because the 
‘old’ science was too simplified and the ‘new’ science needed to be more based on how the system is 
run. This was recognised to be very complicated hence the decision to do it in-house, to be better 
able to understand and use the science:  
“Version 2 has more sophisticated modelling, taking into account that there is a whole lot of 
rules about how the river system should be run. About when dams are to be turned off, what 
flood levels to be allowed, all sorts of rules. So this was informed about the reality of how the 
system is run, how it’s configured to be set, what the rules are. And in addition to that some 
smarter ways of running the river system.” (Mr James, Canberra, 31 Oct 2014). 
The MDBA participants all agreed that the resulting new scientific models were more credible than the 
science presented in the Guide.  
 
External scientists do not consider the new science in the Draft as more credible. General agreement 
is that this opinion is a result of the fact that the external scientists were not involved in the 
development of the science, did not have access to the peer review reports, and therefore cannot 
assess whether or not the science is credible. The outside science community have only seen the 
major components or the end result. According to MDBA participants it was impossible to show 
external scientists the details because it involves hundreds of pieces of work happening 
simultaneously, which made it too complicated. And although the MDBA claims that all of the 
research is peer reviewed, the external scientists say they have not seen the results of those peer 
reviews (more about this in section 5.4).  
 
The fact that the end result, achieved in a way that cannot be replicated by the scientists, implies a 
lesser outcome for the environment and a better outcome for politicians has further triggered 
concerns about the credibility of the science. According to Prof Williams the MDBA was:  
“Probably trying to do the science as independently as possible, up to the Guide. After the 
Guide they threw science to the four winds and picked numbers out of the air. Then they used 
science when they wanted to justify the number they chose but that’s not how you do 
science.” (Prof Williams, Canberra, 29 Oct 2014). 
Dr Connell called it:  
“A more hostile environment to the idea of comprehensive water reform” (Dr Connell, 
Canberra, 29 Oct 2014). 
 
The distrust displayed by these scientists can have different interpretations. One is that this could be 
considered politicisation of science: science is used to justify politically acceptable results. This in 
itself would not be illogical: as seen earlier in this section the MDBA was told to change their focus 
from preference for environmental health to more influence for economic and social needs. Lowering 
the amount of water for the environment in the next version of the Basin Plan is an obvious way to 
show that the MDBA had followed the instructions to change their focus and as such would increase 
salience. Another interpretation is that this is simply the next step in the process as described in the 
Water Act: the Guide was intended to be the published knowledge base, and this next step is where 
the judgement call for policy development is made. In that interpretation the distrust from the 
scientists can be the result of the fact that the problem was incorrectly seen as moderately structured 
(where science can provide answers and clear solutions), which means they find it difficult to accept 
the element of the judgement call. In both interpretations it can be concluded that the distrust of the 
scientists is for a large part caused by the lack of transparency with the process. The response of the 
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scientists (regardless of whether it is politicisation of science or the logical next step in the process) 
was at the start consistent with that of the Science Arbiter: they feel that their knowledge/science had 
led to the wrong conclusions and try to explain how it should have been used. The step towards Issue 
Advocate is then a small step: instead of explaining how their science should have been used, some 
scientists move on to arguing which conclusion should have been drawn. During the interviews these 
participants for example referred to a study by Grafton (2011), which showed that an improved 
environment could provide over $1 billion per year in non-market benefits6; that the water holders 
would be fully compensated for selling their water entitlements and would only have to do that on a 
voluntary basis; and that increased flooding would increase the quality of the soil through flushing out 
of salts and other contaminants, which would result in higher production.  
 
In general most interviewed participants agree that most individual scientists were acting as Science 
Arbiters, like the example above. Some scientists chose the role of Pure Scientist and stayed away 
from any discussion after providing their results. In some cases scientists acted as Pure Scientists not 
by choice, when the MDBA used publications in journals without asking additional input from the 
authors. There were two examples, where scientists openly acted as Issue Advocates. One is that 
some external scientists clearly presented themselves in the role of Issue Advocate. The most 
obvious example is the Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists. Most of these scientists started off 
with advising the MDBA, but Prof Williams says they felt they had to step out:  
”We were originally [providing scientific advice] but we decided that it compromised our 
integrity so we left. Wentworth was asked to see and all we could do was use our brain (…) to 
actually justify their decision, so we said: thank you very much, we’re out of there. “(Prof 
Williams, Canberra, 29 Oct 2014). 
Another example was the discussion around climate change. In general, climate change often led to 
the role of Advocate. According to Mr Young:  
“I think even the national science agency were playing advocacy role around emissions and 
what society globally should be doing, and what government should be doing, in terms of an 
emissions trajectory. They may not necessarily advocate for a particular policy solution to 
achieve that end, but they would certainly, perhaps from an ethical point of view for humanity, 
be saying what sort of emissions and greenhouse gas future we think we should be aiming 
for. “(Mr Young, 29 January 2015). 
A more specific example where external scientists took the role of Issue Advocate with regards to 
climate change is the discussion between different groups of scientists about the difference of 
importance of the historical record versus climate change research (mentioned separately by Dr 
Connell, Dr Pittock and Mr Alexandra): The historical record is a large dataset with information about 
water inflows into storages and rainfall interacting with landscapes. It provides credible information 
about water volumes, which is very relevant for water management because of the great climate 
variability between years. If climate change is ignored, this historical record is very valuable for the 
use in models to predict the future. However, if climate change is expected to make changes in how 
the climatic system will behave in the future, the historical record becomes much less valuable for 
climate modelling. Mr Alexandra had experience of bringing together climate scientists and 
hydrologists, about how to factor in climate change projections in water planning. While the climate 
scientists said that they had detected a shift in the climate and suggested that this should be taken 
into account in planning for future water availability, the hydrologists on the other hand suggested 
their 120 years long records of the water flow in the rivers were more meaningful and reliable. 
According to the interview participants the hydrologists felt more confident about the certainty of their 
data and as result were more successful in arguing their position during the discussions. They felt that 
their historical record was useful in predicting the future, and felt that any changes in flows detected 
from climate science were not likely to be significant. Instead they preferred to see variations in flow 
regimes as a normal part of the climate driven variations in their water records of stream flows. 
Climate scientists were more cautious, being more aware of the uncertainties, and in difficulties of 
drawing policy conclusions from their observations and models, and therefore did not push the issue: 
                                                     
 
 
6 Non-market benefit is a benefit that cannot be measured in terms of traded goods and services. It is 
often calculated as ‘willingness to pay’ (established via questionnaires), in this case willingness-to-pay 
for improvements in the environment.  
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“So despite being advised that there could have been a step change in the climate that could 
be very significant, the hydrologists preferred to rely on hydrological records.”(Mr Alexandra, 
14 Nov 2014). 
 
This is related to the discussion mentioned earlier where some MDBA participants explained that the 
established body of science is science that is peer reviewed, published and has a high level of 
consensus. The climate scientists acknowledge more uncertainties for their climate science, whereas 
the hydrologists see their historical record as an established body of science. According to some 
interviewed participants this was the main reason that climate change was not taken into account in 
the Draft of the Proposed Basin Plan: the science was considered to be too uncertain to be useful for 
policy planning. As an alternative, the Plan includes an adaptive mechanism, to be able to adjust as 
soon as more credible information becomes available. Mr James explained that the climate change 
allowance in the Guide was related to the old method used to establish SDLs, but that the method in 
the Draft was (according to him) more sophisticated and flexible. In this view the Draft did not need to 
include an allowance for climate change, because the new method was based on providing adequate 
water to achieve particular environmental outcomes, and includes the option to adapt SDLs in light of 
new evidence. In general the participants from the science domain disagree: they feel that climate 
change was excluded from the Draft because the government did not believe in climate change, 
making it a politically vulnerable subject, and argue that, even though it is unlikely that there will be 
certainty in climate science soon, feel that the data is clear enough to add ‘no-regret’ actions 
(following the precautionary principle): 
“… essentially the SDL became a somewhat negotiated position. The rhetoric was sort of that 
that was going to account for climate change somehow. It was never explained very well to 
me, from a technical point of view. I think the reality was, it was put a bit in the too-hard-
basket, we’ll worry about it a bit later. (…) There’s a lot of uncertainty around this. And it was 
clear that the adjustments that were being made were already significant, certainly significant 
from a short run economic point of view and from a political point of view. And so given the 
requirement from the Act that they do consider the climate change I would suspect the view 
was: we’ve got to find a way to say that this deals with the climate change dimension of the 
problem.” (Mr Young, 29 January 2015). 
That means that in this case an argument that is expected to enhance credibility (using an established 
body of science), in reality had the opposite effect (as scientists in this case preferred following the 
precautionary principle).  
 
Other local stakeholders that are relevant for the Basin Plan, apart from local irrigation communities, 
include Indigenous groups. The Basin was home to around 70,000 Indigenous people in 2006 
(Jackson, 2011, p. 165). Their needs are different from most of the other local citizens, as they have a 
different cultural profile: their involvement in the irrigation and agricultural industry is much lower than 
other citizens, often live in remote areas, with lower levels of education and more health issues. Not 
much is known of their water needs with regards to their lifestyle and especially their cultural 
responsibilities and obligations with regards to water management (Jackson, 2011, p. 166). The fact 
that there is less water available has had a considerable impact on their ability to maintain their 
lifestyle (Weir, 2011). Indigenous people have only marginally been part of adding local knowledge to 
the Basin Plan, even though they have a long history of water management in the area. The MDBA 
did make efforts to engage them. There is a policy commitment from the government to recognise 
cultural rights to water (‘cultural flow’), but is still unclear what that actually means in practice. One of 
the reasons is that the Indigenous communities have not been able to articulate their needs and 
wishes in a language that is understandable for politicians (Jackson, 2011, p. 174). Dr Pittock gave 
several reasons for why Indigenous groups were not able to provide feedback effectively: they have 
many other pressing socioeconomic concerns, did not have the financial resources or the 
organizational capacity, may have been intimidated by the risk of a backlash from their rural 
communities, and/or did not trust the government because:  
“Often these are communities that have been devastated by having their water stolen from 
them over the past 40 years by state governments for irrigation” (Dr Pittock, Canberra, 30 Oct 
2014). 
Also the setting in which these conversations take place does not stimulate Indigenous participation. 
They were not very capable of expressing their needs in a situation where one or two Indigenous 
representatives, coming from remote communities, were sitting at a table full of ‘white fellas’. 
The limited inclusion of Indigenous values and beliefs makes the Draft less legitimate.  
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5.4 Responses to the Draft 
 
In November 2011 the MDBA released the first Draft of the Proposed Basin Plan. The main change 
with regards to water quantity was that, instead of aiming for an additional reduction of 3,000 to 4,000 
GL/y, the Draft Plan’s goal was a 2,750 GL/y reduction (Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 2011). As 
discussed in section 5.3, this was justified by claims that the new and more sophisticated models, 
developed in-house, made more efficient use of the available water. In a report on changes based on 
feedback (Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 2012a) the MDBA itself mentions as improvements after 
the Guide: engaging with stakeholders, better science, focus on investment in infrastructure (to show 
how water is recovered, and not just how much) and setting an adaptive framework with regular 
reviews and options to improve the Plan over time.  
 
The fact that the Draft promotes one specific volume of water implies that the Authority during this 
part of the process still acted as Issue Advocate. There are two differences with the process leading 
up to the Guide. One is that during the second stage stakeholders were engaged, which would point 
more in the direction of the role of Honest Broker. However, the role of Honest Broker would have 
resulted into an advice with different types of scenarios, with for each scenario the expected impact or 
result, out of which the decision makers could choose. An example of such an advice is the advice of 
the Foresight Future Flooding project in the UK (Van Nassou, 2014). Another difference is that the 
Authority was advocating in a different direction: during the Guide the Authority was seen to be 
promoting a green solution, with emphasis on environmental health, whereas during this stage that 
was not the case. There was discussion about this realignment: the Authority itself claimed to have 
made a judgement call that balanced environmental, economic and social needs in the Draft, whereas 
(external) scientists felt it was mainly aligned with one specific group: the irrigators. The MDBA 
argued that this was a response to concerns from local communities, who not only wanted to know 
how much water was to be recovered, but also how this was going to be done. By focussing on 
investment in irrigation infrastructure, the water that was to be recovered would be the result of a 
lower need for water without negative impact on productivity. The result, according to some scientists, 
is what Prof Williams says is that: 
“most of the money is being spent on gold plating irrigation systems that probably won’t have 
any water in the future.” (Prof Williams, Canberra, 29 Oct 2014). 
 
After release of the Draft, scientists have expressed concerns that the best available science was not 
used. The Wentworth Group argues in a statement that the Plan should be withdrawn and replaced 
by a new process to look at a more structural reform (Cosier et al., 2012). The South Australian 
Government asked the Goyder Institute to perform a review, who concluded that the Draft would 
deliver benefits relative to a ‘do nothing’ scenario, but would not deliver the required environmental 
health under low flow conditions (Lamontagne et al., 2012). Interestingly enough, both MDBA and 
concerned scientists refer to a review done by CSIRO (Young, Bond, Brookes, Gawne, & Jones, 
2011). The MDBA claims (Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 2012a) that the review confirmed that the 
best available science was used: 
“...represents a sufficient basis to begin an adaptive process of managing the level of take in 
the future and that the methods of modelling and analysis used by the MDBA were generally 
robust and defensible.” (Young et al., 2011). 
Concerned scientists on the other hand focus on the fact that the CSIRO had some points of critique 
in that same report. Some of the points of critique are around the fact that the technical 
documentation at the time of the review was incomplete, that the MDBA made limited use of expert 
scientific opinion and of available floodplain inundation models and ecological response models, and 
mentions the absence of a model that shows whether/how the used key indicator sites represent the 
entire Basin.  
 
The Basin States provided feedback as well. Their criticism is not unexpected as it reflects the 
different points of view that existed before the MDBA was established. State governments from 
Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria felt that the expected environmental benefits were 
uncertain and that the science was not credible enough; that the Plan would lead to high impacts for 
local communities, and that the Plan was not clear on how this would be dealt with; and that there 
was not a good system in place to make sure all Basin States would be equally burdened, as 
improvements that were already made by some States were not taken into account (Queensland 
Government, 2012; Ross & Connell, 2014). The South Australian government on the other hand 
argued that the 2,750 GL/y would not be sufficient to ensure environmental health downstream, which 
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in their view meant that the proposed Basin Plan would not protect the environment against threats 
such as salt accumulation; did not use the best available science; and that the Plan does not take into 
account the efficiency of the South-Australian irrigators and the responsible water management of the 
South Australian government in the past (Government of South Australia, 2012; Ross & Connell, 
2014). South Australian Premier Weatherill announced that he was considering the option of a High 
Court challenge to the Plan (Australian Politics, 2012, May 28) but ultimately did not proceed with that 
challenge. The Commonwealth Government, in particular the Federal Water Minister Tony Burke, 
publicly defended the Plan (Duffy, 2011, December 15; Wilson, 2011, 28 November; Woodley, 2011). 
This shows that legitimacy was lower on State level. 
 
Other stakeholders were still negative about the Draft. Environmental groups claimed not enough 
water was to be returned, whereas according to local communities too much water was to be returned 
(Duffy, 2011, December 15). Not everyone in the local communities agreed with that, as for example 
one mayor publicly stated that the Plan would not be that bad (Delaney, 2011, December 16). In 
general most of the critique is around uncertainty: people feel that it is unclear why the proposed 
volume of 2750 GL/y is the best number and what the result will be with regards to environmental 
health, why climate change is not included, where the water should come from, or what the economic 
effect will be for each of the local communities. This focus on uncertainty in the science base again 
shows that people expected to be able to treat this situation as a moderately structured problem, 
where factual research should be able to provide the solution. After the first Draft of the Proposed 
Basin Plan was published, another 20-week consultation round was held with Basin States, local 
governments, catchment management authorities, community, peak industry groups, Indigenous and 
environment groups. Stakeholder consultation generally enhances legitimacy. 
 
According to the MDBA, a large part of the feedback from this second consultation round included 
support for the vision of a healthy Basin and the need for a Basin Plan (Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority, 2012a), which shows high salience. The response of the MDBA with regards to the criticism 
on the science base is to state that all scientific methodologies have been peer reviewed and that the 
peer reviews have been published. The report refers to the CSIRO review mentioned before (but 
leaves out the criticism in that report) but also acknowledges that science and research remain 
relevant for the proposed review cycle. With regards to feedback on the surface water limits the 
MDBA confirms that the 2750GL/y was argued both to be too high and too low, that they still consider 
the 2750GL/y to be a good starting point and propose to check this number during the first review (in 
2015). With regards to uncertainty for local communities the MDBA report states that “the concept of 
‘localism’ – engaging with regional communities to find local solutions to implementing the Basin Plan 
– has been hardwired into the draft plan” (Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 2012a). The feedback in 
this second consultation round resulted in May 2012 in a Proposed Basin Plan that was offered to 
State water Ministers for review, which (after some revisions) became an amended Murray-Darling 
Basin Plan that was signed off by Tony Burke, Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, 
Population and Communities on 22 November 2012 and passed in the Australian Parliament a week 
later. The number of 2,750 GL/y did not change in these versions of the Basin Plan.  
 
An important element of the final Plan is the revision cycle, which means that the Plan will be 
reviewed every few years, which allows for the Plan to be adapted to new knowledge (and new 
perspectives). This increased legitimacy and the effectiveness of the advice, as the decisions that 
were made by endorsing the Plan, can be changed at each cycle, making it more acceptable for 
stakeholders. Another relevant point is that the Basin States (tasked with the implementation) have 
until 2019 to fully implement the aims in their State-level water sharing plans. This also increases 
salience as there is still room for changes in implementation of the Plan. 
 
Despite high levels of critique during the development of the Basin Plan, nearly all participants agree 
that the plan may not be perfect, but that the country is better off with the plan than without. They also 
all agree that a perfect plan is not possible, and that it would have been impossible to get the plan to 
be (almost) perfect in one iteration, because it is too complicated. That is an implication of a problem 
with no consensus on knowledge: the answer is not clear and will need a few iterations to improve. 
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6 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter discusses the effectiveness of the advice and how that relates to the role (according to 
Pielke’s framework) that was chosen.  
6.1 Effectiveness 
 
This section summarises the analysis as mentioned in chapter 5 with regards to the three main 
criteria to measure effectiveness according to Cash et al. (2003): salience, credibility and legitimacy. 
Overall scores can be found in table 4 and are explained in the text. More detailed information about 
the arguments and scores for the different criteria can be found in Appendix E. Effectiveness – 
Summary of results.  
 
Table 4. Score on criteria for effectiveness of the Guide and the Draft, as perceived by different 
stakeholder groups. 
 Guide Draft 
 salience credibility legitimacy salience credibility legitimacy 
science Low High Very Low Low Very Low Medium 
policy Low Low Very Low High Medium Medium 
society Medium Very Low Very Low Medium Low Low 
 
 
As seen in section 2.2, salience is about whether or not the scientific advice is relevant and useful for 
decision makers. This means it is given at the right time, provides useful answers to the problem that 
is on the political agenda and is written in such a way that it is understandable for all 
stakeholders. Important strategies are communication and translation, to make sure that the 
questions answered are the current questions (as they may change over time). As Cash et al. (2003) 
point out:  
“We found effectiveness suffered when communication was largely one-way, whether this 
involved experts assuming they knew what questions decision makers would see as salient or 
decision makers assuming that questions relevant to them were ones experts could credibly 
answer. In such cases, experts often ended up addressing yesterday’s problems (producing 
nonsalient information).” (Cash et al., 2003, p. 8088). 
As seen in chapter 4, the Water Act provided the mandate for the MDBA. Scientists felt that the wrong 
questions were asked and that the focus on water quantity was too limited. This was for a large part 
the result of the organisational structure and the mandate according to the Water Act. In that sense 
the MDBA followed the instructions. This can be seen as salient at the time of establishing the Water 
Act. However, between establishing the MDBA and the moment the Guide was presented, two key 
factors had changed. As seen in chapter 5, the drought created a social environment that was open 
for water reform, making the activities of the MDBA salient. But by the time the Guide was presented, 
the drought had broken and the rains had even resulted in severe flooding in some States. This 
means that the urgency was gone. Also, due to new elections, the politicians sitting in the 
Commonwealth government at the time of the presentation of the Guide were not the same politicians 
as at the time of establishing the Water Act. The Guide answered the questions posed by the Water 
Act, but these changes, together with the backlash from local communities, resulted in a re-
interpretation of the Water Act. This can be seen as an example of what Cash et al. (2003) mentioned 
as “experts addressing yesterday’s problems (producing nonsalient information)”. Another change 
was that during the process of developing the Guide, the MDBA had found out that it was not as easy 
to find answers as had been expected previously (more about that further in this section). This can be 
seen as an example of what Cash et al. (2003) mentioned as “decision makers assuming that 
questions relevant to them were ones experts could credibly answer”. The Draft after that was more in 
line with the political values of that time. This included the removal of measures for climate change 
from the Draft, as this was not seen as politically relevant at that time. Removing climate change 
increased salience. Salience could have been improved by more communication between the MDBA 
and the government and local stakeholders, to ensure better awareness of any changes, of the 
magnitude of the issue and the solutions, and through that better alignment with the relevancy of the 
conclusions, before they were first publicly presented in the Guide. 
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According to the framework the criterion of credibility is about whether or not the scientific advice is 
considered to be adequate. The three indicators are that the information is current and the best 
available knowledge at the time, based on peer-reviewed research, and (where possible) that local 
knowledge is included to make sure the information is applicable to local circumstances.  
Most scientists felt that the science in the Guide, despite some points of critique (around scale, lack of 
social-economic data, complexity of integration, and the choice of numbers with regards to climate 
change), was a credible piece of work. This changed for the science in the Draft: after the main part of 
the science was internalised, the results were not considered to be transparent as the science was 
either not peer reviewed or the results of the peer review were not fully published. Also the end result 
was less favourable for environmental health. As a result the science community felt that the numbers 
in the Draft were based on politically acceptable levels, not on evidence based science. These points 
of critique imply suspected politicisation of science: scientists have concerns that the numbers in the 
Draft were not based on rigorous science, or even on a balance of science and socio-economics, but 
that the new internal modelling activities were intended to lower the numbers to politically acceptable 
levels. Most of the MDBA participants as well in general feel that the science in the Guide was a 
reasonably credible piece of work, but felt that the integration of the different elements was 
considered too simplified and the conclusions drawn too quickly. Most of the MDBA participants who 
are still involved in the second stage, in general consider the science in subsequent versions of the 
Basin Plan (after the Guide) to be more credible than the science in the Guide, because they feel that 
the new models are better. They argue that the science in both reports was adequately peer reviewed 
and based on the best available knowledge. The negative feedback from the communities after the 
Guide was seen as not to be based on the science base, but as a result of general dismissal of the 
Guide, which in itself was a result of poor communication with the local communities and exclusion of 
knowledge from local communities and information from the Basin States.  
 
So in summary credibility suffered from lack of transparency of the science (results of the peer 
reviews, the new modelling methods and the integration) and from lack of early communication with 
the communities, with or without including local knowledge.  
 
Legitimate advice according to Cash is advice that ‘has been respectful of stakeholders’ values and 
beliefs, unbiased in its conception and fair in its treatment of opposing views and interests’. Also, the 
process leading to the advice should be transparent for all stakeholders. The MDBA created 
different reports for different stakeholder groups (translation) to improve understanding, which can 
increase legitimacy. Most participants agree that in the Guide stakeholders’ values and beliefs were 
taken into account only in a very limited way. Scientists were asked to provide input for the first stage 
of the process (developing a knowledge base of facts) but other stakeholders were more or less 
excluded at that time. The socio-economic science in the Guide was weak, which increased the 
perception from the community that their needs were not taken seriously. This was increased by the 
fact that the local communities were still recovering from the drought, which lowered the resilience of 
the local communities and made it harder for them to deal with water reform measures. This resulted 
in a strong sense of injustice at the presentation of the Guide. The way the Guide was presented (lack 
of transparency) and the resulting media headlines antagonised even people who would have 
supported the science, and increased the feeling of distrust within the local communities. All this 
reduced the perception of legitimacy. This backlash from the community in itself again reduced 
salience (as policy makers re-evaluated the interpretation of the mandate) and perceived credibility of 
the science. The result is that for the second stage the MDBA not only had to include the 
stakeholders’ views (to enhance legitimacy) but also had to change the focus of the Basin Plan (to 
increase salience), and redo part of their science (to enhance perceived credibility). In the subsequent 
stage, which was more focused on policy design but still included doing more research and modelling, 
local stakeholders and politicians were asked to provide input, but at that stage external scientists 
were largely kept out of the loop. One person in the MDBA argued that the advice must have been 
seen as legitimate, because it is endorsed by the Federal Parliament. That is a limited interpretation 
of legitimacy, as it excludes all other stakeholders’ views.  
 
In summary: legitimacy could have been enhanced by earlier communication between the MDBA and 
local stakeholders (including irrigators, non-irrigators and Indigenous groups), and more iterative 
communication with other groups, for example external scientists, in later stages.  
 
These three criteria of salience, credibility and legitimacy are often seen as a trade-off, where 
enhancing one can lower one or two of the other criteria. As explained in section 2.2 legitimacy is 
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often balanced against credibility and salience. Legitimacy can be increased by allowing local 
communities to add information, but this is often considered to risk reducing credibility and salience.  
 
In this case the process was intended to enhance credibility by following the principle that to be 
unbiased and independent, the information stream should be one way, and the scientific conclusions 
should be presented to everyone at once. That way these conclusions were made without 
interference from others and therefore unbiased. The MDBA closely followed these requirements of 
the Water Act to increase credibility and salience, but due to the lack in communication and changed 
circumstances (new government, the drought broke) the politicians felt that the Guide answered the 
wrong questions, leading to reduced salience. Also, this approach of excluding stakeholders to 
increase credibility resulted in a strong negative impact on legitimacy. In this case study, salience and 
legitimacy are strongly connected, as the discussion around the mandate and which questions need 
to be answered (salience) focused mainly around which needs (environmental vs socio-economic) 
should be given which level of importance in the advice (legitimacy). So in general the science itself 
was seen as reasonably credible and close to the best available knowledge at that time, but the main 
reason for the rejection of the Guide by the public was due to the fact that they were not included, 
which is a legitimacy problem.  
 
As a response, the MDBA made efforts to increase salience by following the new interpretation of the 
mandate and increase legitimacy through engaging with local communities. They also worked on 
increasing credibility by creating new models in-house. Most of the MDBA participants consider the 
internalised science in the Draft more credible. The question is whether they misused science to 
defend a politically acceptable number, or if the science is unbiased and happened to result in a 
number that is politically acceptable. It is possible that it has been a bit of both. The problem there is 
that by internalising the main part of the science, it is no longer transparent, which has resulted in lack 
of trust by the scientific community. 
 
Mediation activities are intended to manage the boundary between science and policy domain, to 
prevent politicisation of science and scientification of policy. A boundary organisation can use 
mediation activities to find common grounds and enhance legitimacy without decreasing salience and 
credibility. Cash mentions three mediation activities: increasing transparency, bringing all 
perspectives to the table and establishing criteria for decision making.  
 
The MDBA made efforts to increase transparency during the second stage by engaging with 
stakeholders via a consultation round. However, in general the process was not transparent during 
both the stage leading up to the Guide and the stage leading up to the Draft: The results of the Guide 
were presented without prior release, community engagement or discussion of results. With the Draft 
the production of science was invisible to the outside world because the modelling process was 
internalised (see section 5.3).  
 
The MDBA intended to bring all perspectives to the table through asking for and accepting input from 
stakeholders during the consultation rounds. However, the option to provide feedback did not happen 
until after the presentation of the Guide. This late stakeholder engagement had a negative impact on 
the legitimacy of the Guide. This negative response was not considered to be a result of low credibility 
of the science, but it did result in a strong opposition towards the facts as presented in the Guide. 
According to participants in the science domain, this also caused the science in later versions of the 
Basin Plan to be less credible than in the Guide, and the loss of trust from other stakeholders meant 
the MDBA had to regain that trust to improve legitimacy in the later versions of the Basin Plan.  
 
The criteria for decision making, as described in the Water Act, were in general detailed but the 
interpretation left room for different views. After the negative response to the Guide, the policy domain 
suggested that the original interpretation (environment first, socio-economic impact later) had been 
wrong, and that it needed to be different ( equal balance between environmental, social and economic 
impacts). This redefinition of criteria for decision making to be more in line with politicians’ and local 
stakeholders’ perspectives can be seen as mediation activity, but by then it did not include the 
science domain so it still was not an integrated discussion.  
 
The overall impact of the Guide was very negative, where the Draft (with some adjustments) was 
endorsed by the federal Government. Compared to the Guide, the Draft shows higher scores for the 
effectiveness criteria in 6, unchanged scores in 2 and a lower score in only 1 out of 9 criteria (Table 
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4). From these scores the conclusion can be made that the process leading up to the Draft was more 
successful than the process leading up to the Guide. 
6.2 Roles and effectiveness 
 
Chapter 5 has shown that the Authority took up the role of Issue Advocate in both stages. This section 
looks at how that relates to the problem type (as explained in section 2.1) and the effectiveness.  
 
As explained in Table 2 (Page 22) it is theoretically possible to identify the role that would be most 
effective, based on the type of problem that needs to be dealt with. When the MDBA started, there 
was a perceived consensus in values, in a sense that nearly all stakeholders agreed that something 
needed to be done. The millennium drought had caused serious problems due to shortages for 
irrigation, drinking water and environmental flow. However, despite there being consensus on the fact 
that something needed to be done there was no consensus on what needed to be done. This is due 
to significant differences in opinion in between the stakeholder groups. For example, the 
environmental groups value the ecological health of the wetlands, the estuary and in general the 
entire catchment area. They want to see that protected. Others may value growing (more) food for the 
nation and the world as part of alleviating the World Food Problem, or value the local society (either a 
Western or Indigenous society) where they want their children to grow up and have a future, or they 
may mainly be looking at economic growth and making profit. The irrigators themselves can have 
different opinions. This could be depending on where they live: the downstream irrigators will suffer 
from a decline in water quality as a result of low flows much sooner than upstream irrigators. Or it can 
depend on their age and position in life: farmers who want to retire or quit are more likely to agree 
with a water buyback program than farmers who want to stay. These different values and beliefs 
result in different uses and different priorities for use of water. In some cases these value sets are 
very firmly held, which means that compromise is very difficult. Despite the general support for the 
Water Act at the start, the interviews show that MDBA seems to have been aware of these differences 
in value sets from the beginning. Several participants felt that the problem was seen and approached 
as a contest between water for the environment versus water for the economy. Even so, at the start 
the expectations were high that the MDBA would be able to come up with a solution that would be 
acceptable for all parties.  
 
This means that the MDBA started with the perception that there was no consensus on values, but 
expected that science would be able to provide the answers that were needed to come up with an 
optimal balance between water for the environment versus water for consumption. That would result 
in consensus on knowledge. The combination of no consensus on values but consensus on 
knowledge is categorised as a moderately structured problem where, according to the theory outlined 
in chapter 2, science as a mediator and the role of Science Arbiter is expected to be most effective.  
 
As seen in chapter 5, during the process the recognition grew that the science was more complex 
than expected, and that it could not provide all the answers the MDBA was looking for. There is some 
consensus about knowledge: everyone agreed that the environment had suffered in the past as a 
direct consequence of over-allocation of water, resulting in a degradation of environmental health. 
The next step was to agree on the solution: what would be an acceptable level of environmental 
health and how much water would be needed, to achieve and maintain a sustainable level of 
environmental health. Several participants agreed that it is much harder to predict the effect of certain 
levels of water allocation towards the environmental health of the entire Basin, than it is to prove 
existing negative impacts of over-allocation towards specific regional wetland areas. A large part of 
the debate was about the validity of the models that are used to estimate the numbers. After that the 
decisions had to include social and economic impacts of different levels of water extraction, but 
predicting that turned out to be as complicated as predicting the impacts on environmental health.  
 
This shows that, despite the expectations, there is no consensus on knowledge, which means the 
issue should be defined as an unstructured environmental problem. In the case of an unstructured 
problem, according to the theory (chapter 2), science can be seen as a problem recogniser, and as 
described in Pielke’s framework this implies that the most effective role is likely to be that of an 
Honest Broker. Mr Alexandra recognised this: 
“When I look back on a lot of this, I’m now around pretty confident saying that we actually 
have an undue emphasis on accuracy where in many cases it should be around supporting 
judgement.” (Mr Alexandra, 14 Nov 2014). 
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In this specific situation the organisational structure of the MDBA itself made it almost impossible for 
the organisation to play the role of Honest Broker. The role of Honest Broker is characterised by an 
advice that includes a wide range of different scenarios, in this case for example including water 
management strategies, the (economic and social) effects on the local communities, and ideally 
different ways to mitigate negative effects or even turn them into positive effects. However, the MDBA 
by mandate almost exclusively looked at water quantity, not at any of the other elements that define 
and can improve environmental health. Also, the MDBA was not in a position to effectively predict 
impacts on local communities: the MDBA is only responsible for making the plan, and it is up to the 
Basin States to actually work with the plan and manage the water quantity and quality. This meant 
that the MDBA was limited in including water management strategies (as they are part of 
implementation) and the social and economic effects of certain measures. The MDBA did not have 
the knowledge or the mandate to advise on the water management changes that would have to be 
implemented to get to the agreed SDLs and ESLTs. And it is the effect of these water management 
changes that are ultimately felt by the local communities.  
 
A second reason why a choice for the role of Honest Broker was not likely is that, as seen in chapter 
5, in general the culture around science and policy within the water reform area in Australia is not 
familiar with the concepts behind that role. Both the interviewed scientists and the policy makers imply 
that science should be impartial and produce facts. Most participants seem to feel more comfortable 
with, and used to, the idea of scientists who provide facts, with or without explanation. They agree 
that locals and politicians should not interfere in this stage because that could corrupt the science or 
create a bias. Scientists themselves have in this case shown a tendency to steer away from policy-
related questions. 
 
Some interview participants have even raised questions on whether the MDBA can be seen as a 
boundary organisation. For example, Prof Williams argued that the MDBA cannot be a boundary 
organisation, because it has the responsibility of actually delivering a particular program of activity 
under a political agenda. He, and several others, argued that a boundary organisation should be an 
independent organisation that provides scientific advice but stays away from policy choices and 
judgement calls. A statement like this shows the assumption of most participants that scientific advice 
for policy development should be impartial and not influenced by the policy domain. However, the 
definition of a boundary organisation as used in this study is broader than the definition used by Prof 
Williams. In this study it specifically includes responsibility towards the political domain as well as the 
science domain (see chapter 1). Also, despite the fact that Prof Williams feels that this is not what the 
MDBA is doing, it is for a large part what was required by the Water Act with regards to the first stage 
(the development of the Guide). As explained in section 4.2, the Water Act and the Authority had a 
strong intention for the MDBA to be scientifically sound: the use of best available science as 
requirement, employment of scientists based on expertise and not on political values, and stakeholder 
consultations held off until after the knowledge base was completed and published (in the Guide). The 
main deviation from the independence Prof Williams asks for is that the Guide ultimately gives advice 
based on a preference to the environmental needs. The more political stage followed after the Guide, 
and this stage included an invitation for feedback from local communities and politicians. During the 
consultation process the MDBA staff members from the policy planning area were talking to local 
communities, not the scientists. As far as scientists were involved in these community consultations, 
they were there only to explain the science in the Guide and/or Draft. The concept of scientists 
engaging in discussions with local communities to use local knowledge for scientific advice is not 
common. This model has similarities with science in the role of Science Arbiter, which is effective for 
moderately structured problems where science can provide answers, but not for unstructured 
problems.  
 
This leads to the conclusion that the role of Honest Broker does not fit easily with the current cultural 
expectations of the role of science in developing scientific advice for policy development.  
 
In taking the role of Issue Advocate the Authority was following the instructions as laid down in the 
Water Act. Mr James was involved in the development of the Water Act. He explains that the fact that 
the MDBA advised on a limited range of solutions, or one solution, makes it easier for politicians to 
make decisions:  
“And of course the model is that the Authority advises the Minister or the Government on the 
Basin plan and its implementation. And the neat thing about that is that the government and 
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the Minister are able to distance him or herself from that advice. So when they get lobbied by 
the industry: “We want more water for growing crops” or whatever, “and we do not really care 
about the rivers and their health”, the minister can go, “o well, I have a lot of sympathy for you 
farmers, however, I’m obliged to take the advice of these experts. It’s a shame we set them 
up really, you know, we do not really like them that much, but they’re the experts so we have 
to take their advice”. So politically it’s a neat way for Ministers to just put a little bit of distance 
and give them hopefully a little more spine to make decisions.” (Mr James, Canberra, 31 Oct 
2014). 
 
Section 6.1 concluded that the scores for effectiveness for the Draft have been higher than those for 
the Guide. Chapter 5 has shown that the Authority chose the role of Issue Advocate in both stages. 
These results in themselves do not show a clear causal relation between the effectiveness of the 
advice and the role of the advisory group. This implies that choosing the role of Issue Advocate in 
itself does not define the effectiveness of the advice.  
 
However, when looked at more detail there is evidence of a causal relation. Even though in both 
stages the MDBA chose the same role, there are two main differences between both stages: 
1. The choice of alignment of the advocacy changed to a different value set.  
2. The second stage saw more engagement with the policy and society domains.  
 
With regards to the value alignment of advocacy the solution in the first stage was mainly presented 
from an environmental point of view, whereas in the second stage the socio-economic values were 
much more prevalent. This resulted in higher salience in the second stage. It can be argued that the 
Draft was more successful (the scientific advice more effective) because it was more attuned to the 
values of the majority of the decision makers.  
 
With regards to the higher level of stakeholder engagement, according to the theory of Cash et al., 
communication ideally is ‘active, iterative and inclusive’. In this case the MDBA has given the 
opportunity to all stakeholder groups to provide feedback, so it was inclusive. It was not iterative as 
the MDBA consulted each group a limited number of times (in the first stage this was predominantly 
the science domain, and the second stage the local communities and politicians) and the 
communication was mostly one-way, but overall more stakeholders were involved in the second 
stage, leading to an increase in legitimacy. This implies that stakeholder engagement has been an 
important element in the effectiveness of the advice. Despite the limited number of interactions, the 
consultations have improved the uptake of the Draft. The fact that it turned out to be an unstructured 
problem can explain why the lack of stakeholder consultation became such a key element in the 
rejection of the Guide.  
 
A comparable case study looks at the Second Delta Committee in the Netherlands (Brehm, 2013). 
This Committee had been established to provide advice on Dutch water policy for the long term (the 
next 100 years) with a focus on flood prevention due to possible consequences of climate change. 
The Committee asked several scientists and other stakeholders to provide information, for example 
through presentations (giving these stakeholders the role of Science Arbiter), but the Committee itself 
took up the role of Issue Advocate. The advice that was given was based on a worst case scenario of 
sea level rise. Despite this rather extreme position, the advice met with little resistance and the 
recommendations were taken up and turned into policy. According to Brehm (2013) the effectiveness 
was due to the fact that the timing was very good, the communication campaign was smart and 
effective, and the choice of providing one vision (as Issue Advocate) was well accepted by all parties. 
The only negative feedback came from scientists, who found that the science was less credible due to 
the fact that the most extreme scenario of climate change impacts was chosen. 
 
The Delta Committee case study shows several similarities to the MDBA case study. One similarity is 
that both organisations were asked to develop policy advice, took the role of Issue Advocate and 
included stakeholder consultations (albeit the MDBA only in the second stage) which is more a 
characteristic of the Honest Broker role. A difference is that the Delta Committee was more 
successful, which can be explained by a high level of salience (partly as a result of a smart 
communication campaign) and high level of legitimacy (as a result of transparency and earlier 
stakeholder consultation). For both the Delta Committee and the Authority the mandate is to develop 
policy documents instead of general scientific advice, which implies a strong accountability towards 
the political domain. In both cases the role that was taken was that of the Issue Advocate, as 
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instructed by their mandate, but (as discussed above) also useful as it makes it easier for politicans to 
make decision. Because of this the author would like to argue that this suggests that a mandate to 
develop a policy document implies that the advisory committee had to take the role of Issue Advocate. 
Pielke’s framework expects Issue Advocates to only engage with those stakeholders that are aligned 
with their value preferences, but that was not the case for both the Delta Committee and the Authority, 
as they were both consulting all stakeholders, and still acted effectively in the role of Issue Advocate. 
The conclusion from these two examples is that a boundary organisation with the role of Issue 
Advocate can include extensive stakeholder engagement to improve legitimacy and as a 
consequence provide more effective advice. 
6.3 Refining the Framework 
 
So in summary we have seen that the Water Act (the mandate) and the current cultural expectations 
are consistent with the role of Science Arbiter, which fits the perception of the type of problem 
(moderately structured) at the time of writing the Water Act. The result showed that it would have 
been more appropriate to adopt the role of Honest Broker, both theoretically (based on the type of 
problem it turned out to be) and to some level in reality (based on the feedback on stakeholder 
engagement). The role that was actually chosen is that of Issue Advocate, but that in itself seems to 
have had a limited influence on the level of effectiveness, as it was the same role for both stages with 
a different outcome in levels of effectiveness. The main differences between those two stages, that 
can explain the different outcome with regard to effectiveness, are the fact that in the second stage 
the MDBA aligned itself with a different value set and that the second stage included the option for 
stakeholders to provide feedback (which did not happen in the first stage). This section will look more 
closely at these two differences with regards to Pielke’s framework.  
 
Pielke’s framework looks at the degree to which value sets are related to the four different roles. In his 
theory, Pure Scientists and Science Arbiters feel that their personal values should not interfere with 
science, but they also stay away from values and different perspectives in general. Honest Brokers 
acknowledge that there are different value sets and perspectives but intend to not put their own value 
set first. For the Issue Advocates value sets are an almost inevitable part of the advocacy, although 
their intention is that their opinions are based on scientific facts and expertise. Although in some 
literature stakeholder engagement within the role of Issue Advocate is limited to engaging with like-
minded groups and individuals, it is possible that the Advocate consults with all parties but still 
provides an advice with a value choice (judgement call). As seen in section 2.3, the theory states that 
for unstructured problems the role of Honest Broker is likely to be most effective, but the analysis in 
section 6.2 argues that limiting the number of solutions, or providing one solution, can be more 
effective in a policy environment, as that is what politicians prefer to work with. This means that value 
alignment plays an important part in the effectiveness of the advice. In this case study, the Guide was 
more aligned to values that give preference to environmental health, which was politically acceptable 
at the time when the Water Act was established. The Draft was more attuned to the politically 
acceptable values of the time when the Guide and the Draft were presented. The obvious problem 
here is that advice that is based on a judgement call and aligned with one specific value set can be 
considered to be less credible (if it is suspected that the results of the science are adjusted to fit the 
chosen value set) and less legitimate (if it is considered to be unfair to those who disagree with the 
value alignment). In this case study as well as the case study around the Delta Committee (Brehm, 
2013), the science domain critiqued that they felt that the science was not credible. But legitimacy 
was high for the Delta Committee case, and changed from very low to higher between the two stages 
for the MDBA case.  
 
That leads to the second main difference between the process leading up to the Guide and the Draft, 
which is the fact that for the Draft stakeholders were engaged through consultation rounds and an 
invitation to provide feedback. The fact that stakeholder engagement for the Draft improved legitimacy 
even though the chosen role was that of Issue Advocate would not have been recognised under 
Pielke’s framework, as it does not include this as a relevant factor for the role of Issue Advocate. 
Pielke’s theory in general is somewhat unclear on what is included in stakeholder engagement. There 
are different levels of ambiguity with regards to the term stakeholder engagement. One is about the 
type of engagement. Stakeholder engagement, as seen from a scientist’s point of view, can for 
example be in the form of providing information (to defend your position), collecting information (for 
knowledge production), checking the response on your conclusions (to look for feedback and 
acceptability) or asking for solutions (to include them in the decision making process). Pielke makes 
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no distinction between engaging with stakeholders to find the impact of the proposed solutions, or 
engaging in such a way that local knowledge is included in the knowledge production. Other authors 
have recognised that as well. For example, Turnhout, Stuiver, Klostermann, Harms, and Leeuwis 
(2013) put the different roles of science on a scale, ranging from limited to intensive interaction 
between knowledge producers and users (see Figure 5). This range includes a new role, which is that 
of the participatory knowledge producer. The article of Turnhout et al. (2013) has split these roles and 
interprets the role of honest broker as interacting closely with the knowledge producers and the 
knowledge users, by offering knowledge and possible solutions to users. The participatory knowledge 
producer also works closely with knowledge users, but in such a way that the knowledge users are 
part of the knowledge production and/or the development of solutions. Turnhout et al. (2013) exclude 
the role of advocate in this scale, as this is considered to be independent of the level of interaction 
with users. However, Pielke’s framework leaves no room for a situation where an advisory group does 
include stakeholders (key part of the honest broker role) but still makes recommendations on a 
selection of solutions or one solution only (key part of the advocate role). Others (including the theory 
on which this thesis is based) assume that Issue Advocates only engage with stakeholders with 
similar value sets.  
 
 
Figure 5. Different roles of science on the spectrum between knowledge production and use (Turnhout et al., 
2013, p. 356) 
One other point that can be made is that terms that are used to define stakeholders are often unclear 
about what is included in these terms. For example, Turnhout et al. (2013) use the term ‘knowledge 
user’ as compared to ‘knowledge producer’ but it is unclear if that includes local policy makers, local 
citizens, other interest groups like NGOs or only the specific policy makers who commissioned the 
advice. Similar confusion exists with the word ‘community’ (Mulligan, 2011, p. 135) and with the word 
‘stakeholder engagement’ in general. This is partly because splitting the discussion up between the 
science domain (including words like scientists and knowledge producers), policy domain (including 
politicians and decision makers) and society (including words like stakeholders and communities) is a 
simplification for all groups. Knowledge producers are not always a homogenous group of scientists. 
For example, in the case of the MDBA different groups of scientists (internal and external) provided 
information in different ways, the Basin States have knowledge and local citizens (including 
Indigenous groups) could contribute important knowledge (making them knowledge producers without 
being scientists). Decision makers are not synonym to politicians: in the case of the MDBA mainly 
Commonwealth politicians are decision makers, whereas State politicians have limited influence and 
Councils of local communities even less so. The term stakeholders in this case study is sometimes 
limited to local communites and sometimes includes a wider range, from NGOs, irrigators and their 
families, pastoralists, providers of recreation like campsites, entire towns or townships, Indigenous 
communities and even citizens of larger cities like Adelaide and Canberra, with regards to their 
drinking water. All these different groups have different needs, values and perspectives. It would be 
helpful to create clearer definitions or terms to identify the different kinds of stakeholder groups and 
levels of stakeholder engagement.  
 
Based on this case study it seems that Pielke’s framework could be refined with regards to the 
effectiveness of the role of Issue Advocate combined with choice of value alignment to improve 
salience and the influence of stakeholder engagement to improve legitimacy. It would be interesting to 
see if this can be found in other case studies as well, and perhaps with a larger/different set of 
indicators for effectivity. It could also be interesting to repeat this study in a different cultural 
environment, especially where the inclusion of local knowledge is more prevalent and scientists are 
more used to the role of Honest Broker.  
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Appendix A. List of interview questions 
Identifying position of participant 
 
1a. Were you, as a scientist, involved in providing scientific advice during any or both of these 
stages? If so, for which stage, and in what capacity (part of an organisation, commissioned, MDBA 
employee)? 
 
1b. Were you involved in policy making / writing the Guide and/or Draft Basin Plan? 
 
1c. Were you involved in another capacity, for example as scientist or politician commenting on the 
Guide and/or the Draft? 
 
 
Selection / assignment  
 
2. How do you think the scientists providing advice to the MDBA were selected/asked? 
  
3. Do you feel they were selected because they represented a specific group, or did they participate 
on a personal title and as an independent expert?  
 
4. Do you think that ultimately the group of advisors was well composed in terms of the number of 
advisors, age, gender, expertise (e.g. expects from a technical, socioeconomic and environmental 
background?) and that different perspectives on water management were represented?  
 
5. Do you think the advisors were provided with a clear mandate? Was there a difference between the 
two different stages with regards to clarity of the mandate?  
 
6. Do you think there was a clear and accepted definition of the problem and the knowledge needed 
to address it? Was there a difference between the two different stages, for example was there more 
or less consensus on the definition of the problem and knowledge needed at a later stage? 
 
7. Do you think there were different perspectives between the advisors about basic principles, risk 
perceptions and believes (e.g. balancing environment and community needs, level of threat through 
climate change?), or was the issue more considered to be a scientific/technical problem?.  
How were these different perspectives handled? 
 
8. Do you think that the advisors had enough human and financial resources as well as access to 
data and information to carry out the work? If not, why do you think the group was not sufficiently 
endowed?  
 
 
Roles  
 
9. Do you think there was enough room for innovative solutions? (or do you think they had to make 
compromises?)  
 
10. When advising policy-makers, there are various possible ways of approaching this:  
a. One could take a purely scientific stand and present the facts that have been scientifically 
proven.  
b. Alternatively, one can present these facts but also try to filter the debate as much as 
possible from factual mistakes.  
c. Or one can say: : I am here to listen to different stakeholders (societal, scientific and political 
domain), work together with as many of them as possible on producing advice, in order to 
broaden the range of policy alternatives. 
d. Or a last way of approaching is to say: I know what the best approach for the Basin is and I 
am here as expert to guide policy that way.  
During the different stages, what do you think the approach of the advisors was? Do you know if there 
were different views amongst the advisors on how this should be done?  
Was this the same for both stages or did this change? 
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11. Do you have a clear vision if how those who asked/commissioned the advisors, thought that they 
had to perform in this respect? Very independent, to keep the debate factually correct, to propagate 
certain solutions, or to operate in an interactive way to broaden the range of solutions? (In other 
words, what role did they expect the scientists to take?) 
 
12. Did the group of advisors also function like that or did the goal change? Was this the same for the 
two stages? 
 
13. How did you expect the advisors to function? 
 
Outcomes  
The following questions are about how the advice is received by different groups, like policy makers, 
public, other scientists.  
 
14. How was the scientific advice underpinning the Guide and/or Draft presented to policy makers and 
the public? 
 
15. Did you feel that the Guide and/or the Draft were adequately based on the provided scientific 
advice? 
 
16. How would you describe the reception of the produced scientific advice by the policy makers 
(those who wrote the Guide and Draft): was there endorsement or rejection of the science? If so, by 
who was the science rejected and how was it expressed? Was there a difference for Guide and Draft? 
 
17. Because of the reactions the science in the Guide generated at the time, do you feel that the 
scientific advice underpinning the Guide was timed well? Did it speak to political discussions that were 
going on at the moment the report came out? In other words, was it perceived relevant at the time? 
And was this perceived relevance different for policy makers, scientists and / or the public?  
(Same for the Draft) 
 
18. When an advice like this comes out, it obviously helps when people feel that it is based on sound 
thinking and science.  
Were the underpinnings of the advice perceived as credible by other scientists? Were there 
dissenting voices from other scientists, and if so, do you feel that this affected the way the report was 
received? If so, how?  
Do you think that, in terms of being a credible advice, the science underpinning the Guide and/or Draft 
was perceived differently by politics, scientists and/or the general?  
 
19. The following question deals with legitimacy of policy advice. It is important that the scientific 
advice is received as fair and balanced, for instance towards the various groups involved in water 
management (e.g. local authorities and communities from the different states, Indigenous groups) and 
that the process leading to the advice was fair and balanced. Do you think the science underpinning 
the Guide and/or Draft was seen as fair and balanced and proposing socially appropriate measures 
and that the process in which the advice what developed was considered fair and honest by all 
stakeholders? Or were there complaints about this, and if so, did this affect the reception of the 
advice? (Note: this is not about how the Guide/Draft were seen, but how the science underpinning the 
Guide/Draft were perceived) 
Were there differences between the two different stages? 
(Note for interviewer: you need to highlight different groups, for example politicians, government 
departments responsible for setting and carrying out policy, other scientists, environmental groups 
etcetera, that might have a different take on the perception of the legitimacy of the report).  
 
20. The final Basin Plan will not be fully into effect until 2019 and is mainly an overarching document 
that forces state governments to include this in their water sharing plans.  
Do you think that the fact that the advice that was given on a larger time scale instead of a short time 
scale, therefore taking the advice away from current agreements and current decisions, contributed in 
any way to the perception of legitimacy of the advice by the stakeholders?  
And do you think that the fact that it does not set strict rules but leaves room for interpretation 
contributed in any way to the perception of legitimacy of the advice by the stakeholders? 
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21. To what level do you think the provided scientific advice has impacted on the current and 
developing state policies? To what level do you feel that it has been picked up? Are you optimistic or 
pessimistic about what will be done?  
 
22. Depending on how you feel about the impacts on policy making: what explains the success, or the 
lack of success of the science towards developing the Basin Plan in your opinion? 
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Appendix B. Interview participants 
Table 5. Names and functions of interview participants, including when and where they were held. 1+2. The 
interviews with Mr James & Ms Nutter, and Mr Raising & Mr Hyde were held at the same time 
Name Position/function Relation with the case  When Where  
Mr Rob Freeman Chief Executive and Member, 
Murray-Darling Basin 
Authority (until September 
2011) 
Science/policy domain 7 Nov 2014 Telephone 
 
 
Mr Russell James Executive Director, Policy and 
Planning Division, MDBA 
Employee of MDBA, 
policy domain 
31 Oct 20141 Canberra 
 
 
Mr Greg Raisin Director of Research and 
Knowledge, MDBA 
Employee of MDBA, 
science domain 
30 Oct 20142 Canberra 
 
 
Mr Peter Hyde Director of Groundwater 
Planning, MDBA 
Employee of MDBA, 
science domain 
30 Oct 20142 Canberra 
 
 
Mr Bill Young water resources specialist Various roles in 
CSIRO & MDBA 
Science domain 
29 Jan 2015 Skype 
Mr Jason 
Alexandra 
Senior Executive Ecosystem 
management and NRM, 
MDBA (until Feb 2013) 
Employee of MDBA, 
science domain 
13 Nov 2014 Telephone 
 
 
 
Ms Jenny Nutter International Engagement 
Officer, MDBA 
Employee of MDBA 
Policy domain 
31 Oct 20141 Canberra 
 
 
Dr Daniel Connell Research Fellow, Crawford 
School of Public Policy, 
Australian National University 
Scientist, public policy, 
Science domain 
29 Oct 2014 Canberra 
 
 
 
Dr Sondoss 
Elsawah 
Research Fellow, University 
of New South Wales 
Scientist, socio-
economics 
Science domain 
31 Oct 2014 Canberra 
 
 
Dr John Williams Adjunct Professor, Australian 
National University, also 
founding member of 
Wentworth group of 
Concerned Scientists 
Scientist, natural 
resources 
Science domain 
29 Oct 2014 Canberra 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Jamie Pittock Associate Professor, Fenner 
School of Environment and 
Society, Australian National 
University 
Scientist, freshwater 
ecosystems and 
climate change 
Science domain 
30 Oct 2014 Canberra 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: views expressed by the participants are their personal views, and do not necessarily reflect the 
views or the official position of their employer or organisation. 
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Appendix C. Water Act 2007 - Authority 
This appendix includes the relevant sections in the Water Act 2007 (Cth.), with regards to the 
membership of the Authority and the decision making process.  
 
Part 9 
Division 2 Authority’s constitution and membership 
Subdivision B—Authority’s membership 
177 Authority’s membership 
The Authority consists of the following members: 
(a) a Chair; 
(b) 4 other members. 
Note: Section 18B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 deals with the title of 
the Chair. 
 
178 Appointment of Authority members 
Appointment by instrument 
(1) Each Authority member is to be appointed by the Governor-General by written instrument. 
Note: For re-appointment, see subsection 33(4A) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. 
 
Eligibility for appointment 
(2) To be eligible for appointment as an Authority member, an individual must, at the time of 
appointment: 
(a) have a high level of expertise in one or more fields relevant to the Authority’s functions; 
and 
(b) not be a member of the governing body of a relevant interest group. 
(3) For the purposes of this Act, a field relevant to the Authority’s functions includes each of the 
following: 
(a) water resource management; 
(b) hydrology; 
(c) freshwater ecology; 
(d) resource economics; 
(e) irrigated agriculture; 
(f) public sector governance; 
(g) financial management. 
 
(4) For the purposes of this Act, an individual is a member of the governing body of a relevant interest 
group if: 
(a) the individual is one of the persons involved in the management of another entity; and 
(b) that other entity (whether incorporated or otherwise): 
(i) represents one or more classes of holders of water access rights, water delivery 
rights or irrigation rights; or 
(ii) advocates managing the Basin water resources in a particular way. 
 
Basis of appointments 
(5) The Authority Chair must be appointed on a full-time basis. 
(6) An Authority member (other than the Authority Chair) must be appointed on a part-time basis. 
 
Validation 
(7) The appointment of an individual as an Authority member is not invalid because of a defect or 
irregularity in connection with the individual’s appointment. 
(Water Act 2007 (Cth), s. 177-178) 
 
 
Division 3 Decision-making and delegation by Authority 
Subdivision A—Meetings 
 
194 Decisions at meetings etc. 
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(1) At a meeting of the Authority, a question is decided by a majority of the votes of the Authority 
members present and voting. 
(2) The person presiding at a meeting has a deliberative vote and, in the event of an equality of votes, 
also has a casting vote. 
(Water Act 2007 (Cth), s. 194) 
 
197 Decisions without meetings 
(1) A decision is taken to have been made at a meeting of the Authority if: 
(a) without meeting, a majority of the Authority members indicate agreement with the 
proposed decision in accordance with the method determined by the Authority under 
subsection (2); and 
(b) all the Authority members were informed of the proposed decision, or reasonable efforts 
were made to inform all the Authority members of the proposed decision. 
(2) Subsection (1) applies only if the Authority: 
(a) has determined that it applies; and 
(b) has determined the method by which Authority members are to indicate agreement with 
proposed decisions. 
(Water Act 2007 (Cth), s. 197) 
 
 
Subdivision D—Advisory committees 
202 Basin Community Committee 
(1) The Authority must, by writing, establish an advisory committee, to be known as the Basin 
Community Committee. 
 
Committee’s functions 
(2) The Basin Community Committee’s function is to advise the Authority about the performance of 
the Authority’s functions, including advising about: 
(a) engaging the community in the preparation of each draft Basin Plan; and 
(b) community matters relating to the Basin water resources; and 
(c) matters referred to the Committee by the Authority. 
 
Subcommittees 
(3) The Basin Community Committee must establish: 
(a) an irrigation subcommittee; and 
(b) an environmental water subcommittee; 
and may establish other subcommittees. 
 
Membership 
(4) The Basin Community Committee consists of a Chair and up to 16 other members as the Authority 
appoints from time to time under subsection 204(1). Any member of the Committee may be the 
Committee Chair. 
Note: For eligibility for appointment, see subsection 204(3). 
(5) The Basin Community Committee’s membership must include: 
(a) at least one Authority member; and 
(b) at least 8 individuals who are water users or representatives of one or more water users. 
(6) The Authority must call for expressions of interest from the public before appointing a member of 
the Committee under subsection 204(1). 
 
Water users etc. 
(7) In this section: 
water user means a person who: 
(a) is engaged in irrigated agriculture; or 
(b) is engaged in environmental water management; or 
(c) uses water for industrial purposes; or 
(d) uses stock and domestic water. 
 
(8) An instrument under subsection (1) is not a legislative instrument. 
(Water Act 2007 (Cth), s. 202) 
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Appendix D. Water Act 2007 - Basin Plan 
This appendix includes the relevant sections in the Water Act 2007 (Cth.), with regards to the 
requirements for the Basin Plan.  
 
 
Part 2 
Division 1 - Basin Plan 
Subdivision B—Basin Plan, its purpose and contents 
20 Purpose of Basin Plan 
The purpose of the Basin Plan is to provide for the integrated management of the Basin water resources 
in a way that promotes the objects of this Act, in particular by providing for: 
(a) giving effect to relevant international agreements (to the extent to which those agreements 
are relevant to the use and management of the Basin water resources); and 
(b) sustainable limits on the quantities of surface water and ground water that may be taken 
from the Basin water resources (including by interception activities); and 
(c) Basin-wide environmental objectives for water-dependent ecosystems of the Murray-
Darling Basin and water quality and salinity objectives; and 
(d) the use and management of the Basin water resources in a way that optimises economic, 
social and environmental outcomes; and 
(e) water to reach its most productive use through the development of an efficient water 
trading regime across the Murray-Darling Basin; and 
(f) requirements that a water resource plan for a water resource plan area must meet if it is to 
be accredited or adopted under Division 2; and 
(g) improved water security for all uses of Basin water resources. 
 
21 General basis on which Basin Plan to be developed 
Basin Plan to implement international agreements 
(1) The Basin Plan (including any environmental watering plan or water quality and salinity 
management plan included in the Basin Plan) must be prepared so as to provide for giving effect to 
relevant international agreements (to the extent to which those agreements are relevant to the use and 
management of the Basin water resources). 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the Basin Plan must: 
(a) be prepared having regard to: 
(i) the fact that the use of the Basin water resources has had, and is likely to have, 
significant adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity; 
and 
(ii) the fact that the Basin water resources require, as a result, special measures to 
manage their use to conserve biodiversity; and 
(b) promote sustainable use of the Basin water resources to protect and restore the ecosystems, 
natural habitats and species that are reliant on the Basin water resources and to conserve 
biodiversity. 
Note: See Articles 7 and 8 of the Biodiversity Convention. 
(3) Without limiting subsection (1), the Basin Plan must also: 
(a) promote the wise use of all the Basin water resources; and 
(b) promote the conservation of declared Ramsar wetlands in the Murray-Darling Basin. 
Note: See Article 3 of the Ramsar Convention. 
 
Basis on which Basin Plan to be developed 
(4) Subject to subsections (1), (2) and (3), the Authority and the Minister must, in exercising their 
powers and performing their functions under this Division: 
(a) take into account the principles of ecologically sustainable development; and 
(b) act on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and socio-economic analysis; 
and 
(c) have regard to the following: 
(i) the National Water Initiative; 
(ii) the consumptive and other economic uses of Basin water resources; 
(iii) the diversity and variability of the Basin water resources and the need to adapt 
management approaches to that diversity and variability; 
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(iv) the management objectives of the Basin States for particular water resources; 
(v) social, cultural, Indigenous and other public benefit issues; 
(vi) broader regional natural resource management planning processes; 
(vii) the effect, or potential effect, of the Basin Plan on the use and management of 
water resources that are not Basin water resources; 
(viii) the effect, or the potential effect, of the use and management of water resources 
that are not Basin water resources on the use and management of the Basin water 
resources; and 
(ix) the State water sharing arrangements. 
Note 1: Paragraph (b): the best available scientific knowledge includes the best available systems for accounting 
for water resources. 
Note 2: An example of a management objective referred to in subparagraph (c)(iv) might be preservation of the 
natural values of a river system through no development or minimal development. 
Note 3: See also subsection 25(3) (which deals with the water quality and salinity management plan). 
 
Basin Plan not to reduce protection of planned environmental water provided for under 
existing State water management laws 
(5) The Basin Plan must ensure that there is no net reduction in the protection of planned 
environmental water from the protection provided for under the State water management law of a Basin 
State immediately before the Basin Plan takes effect. 
Basin Plan not to be inconsistent with Snowy Water Licence 
(6) The Basin Plan must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the licence issued under section 22 
of the Snowy Hydro Corporatisation Act 1997 of New South Wales. 
(7) In applying subsection (6), a variation of the licence after the commencement of Part 2 of this Act is 
to be disregarded unless the variation is prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this 
subsection. 
 
(Water Act 2007 (Cth), s. 20-21) 
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Appendix E. Effectiveness – Summary of results 
This appendix includes four tables with scores for the three criteria for effectiveness: a table each for 
the Guide and the Draft with the main arguments found during the interviews and literature review, a 
third table with the resulting scores and a fourth table with a summary of these scores for the science, 
policy and society domain. For more information on these arguments see chapter 5, for more 
information about the scores see chapter 6.  
 
 
Table 6. Summary of elements that influenced the three criteria for effectiveness with regards to the Guide 
 Guide   
 salience credibility legitimacy 
    
Authority drought created 
urgency; followed the 
mandate 
overall positive with some 
critique, including 
integration and socio 
economic not done well; not 
enough time; peer reviews 
positive 
stakeholder engagement 
not necessary at this 
stage 
internal 
MDBA 
answers may not be 
available 
peer reviews positive; focus 
on established body of 
science; unbiased and 
independent; transparent 
through providing database 
with knowledge 
stakeholder engagement 
not necessary at this 
stage 
 
Science Domain 
CSIRO  provided best science 
available 
 
external wrong questions 
asked; answers may 
not be available; 
scope too narrow 
overall find science credible 
despite critique; peer review 
results unclear; wrong 
choice regarding climate 
change; innovative science 
and local knowledge 
excluded 
local knowledge 
excluded; not enough 
engagement with local 
communities 
 
Policy Domain 
federal understimated 
impact; surprised by 
content of the Guide; 
wrong interpretation 
of mandate 
uncertain surprised by content of 
the Guide 
state  limited use of state 
knowledge; uncertain 
less collaborative 
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local rural understimated impact did not agree with numbers understimated impact; 
no prior engagement; 
less collaborative; 
uncertain about 
consequences 
 
Society Domain 
irrigators 
upstream 
not what they had in 
mind;  
did not agree with numbers; 
reject Guide 
understimated impact; 
no prior engagement; 
less collaborative; feeling 
of injustice; uncertain 
about consequences 
irrigators 
downstream 
agree with the need 
for environmental 
health 
did not agree with numbers; 
reject Guide 
understimated impact; 
no prior engagement; 
less collaborative; feeling 
of injustice; uncertain 
about consequences 
other rural mixed views; some 
agree with the need 
for environmental 
health 
uncertain no prior engagement; 
mixed views 
env/NGO   no prior engagement 
Indigenous   no prior engagement 
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Table 7. Summary of elements that influenced the three criteria for effectiveness with regards to the Draft 
 Draft   
 salience credibility legitimacy 
    
Authority re-interpretation of 
mandate 
  
internal MDBA closer aligned with 
current policy question; 
no explicit adjustment 
for climate change; 
response to feedback 
from local communities 
internalised science; 
better models; peer 
reviewed; established 
body of science 
consultation round 
provided option for 
feedback;  
 
Science Domain 
CSIRO    
external wrong questions asked no access to science and 
peer review results; not 
best available science 
used; only seen end result; 
concerned about end 
results; mixed opinions 
about climate change 
science 
feedback was possible; 
consultation round was 
limited to one-way; too 
much focus on one 
group (irrigators) 
 
Policy Domain 
federal closer aligned with 
current policy question; 
no explicit adjustment 
for climate change; 
ultimately endorsed Plan 
after some revisions 
support for MDBA in new 
modelling 
more balanced result 
state until 2019 for 
implementation 
States concerned about 
uncertainties; South 
Australia requested 
review from Goyder which 
said it would improve 
environmental health but 
not enough; overall less 
negative than with Guide 
feedback was possible; 
expect high impact on 
communities; unfair 
distribution of cuts; 
more positive than with 
the Guide 
local rural more agreement with 
mandate 
more agreement with 
numbers 
still find it unfair 
 
Society Domain 
irrigators 
upstream 
understand the need for 
water reform 
too much water returned 
to the environment; 
feedback was possible; 
revision cycle allows for 
updates 
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irrigators 
downstream 
understand the need for 
improved environmental 
health 
 not enough water 
returned ;  
feedback was possible; 
concerned by new Chair 
being from NSW; 
concern for unfair 
distribution of cuts; 
revision cycle allows for 
updates 
other rural mixed views; understand 
the need for improved 
environmental health 
 feedback was possible 
env/NGO  no agreement with 
numbers; 
feedback was possible; 
not enough water 
returned to the 
environment; revision 
cycle allows for updates 
Indigenous   feedback was possible; 
very limited inclusion of 
Indigenous needs; 
process for consultation 
does not fit with 
cultural differences 
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Table 8 Scores for the three criteria for effectiveness. 
  Guide Draft 
  salience credibility legitimacy salience credibility legitimacy 
MDBA Authority Very high High Medium Very 
high 
  
internal 
MDBA 
Medium High Medium Very 
high 
Very high High 
OVERALL High High Medium Very 
high 
Very high High 
science CSIRO  High     
external Low High Very Low Low Very Low Medium 
OVERALL Very Low High Very Low Low Very Low Medium 
policy federal Very Low Low Very Low High High Medium 
state  Low Low Medium Medium Medium 
local rural Low Low Very Low High  Medium Low 
OVERALL Low Low Very Low High  Medium Medium 
society irrigators 
upstream 
Low Very Low Very Low Medium Low Medium 
irrigators 
downstream 
High Very Low Very Low Medium Low Low 
other rural Medium Low Very Low Medium  Medium 
env/NGO   Very Low  Low Low 
Indigenous   Very Low   Low 
OVERALL Medium Very Low Very Low Medium Low Low 
 
 
Table 9. Summary of scores for the three criteria for effectiveness 
 Guide Draft 
 salience credibility legitimacy salience credibility legitimacy 
MDBA High High Medium Very high Very high High 
science Low High Very Low Low Very Low Medium 
policy Low Low Very Low High Medium Medium 
society Medium Very Low Very Low Medium Low Low 
 
 
